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PREFACE
One of the most important decisions taken by the Repu-
blic of Panama after becoming an independent country, Novem-
ber 3, 1903, was to adopt its Constitution on February 15,
1904. This important document was the result of a rapid im-
provisation even though the country as a province of Colom-
bia had enjoyed already partial independence in its adminis-
tration. This fact emphasizes the attitude towards the im-
migration described in the Constitution. It is necessary to
recall the principal articles related to this matter in or-
der to understand the legal conditions that ruled the immi-
grants who were already in the country or those who wished
to corae.^
The purpose of the Constitution was specifically to
promote the general welfare and to guarantee the benefits of
freedom to Panamanians and to any other individual who inha-
bited the country. This statement revealed a noble attitude
towards the large number of prospective immigrants attracted
by the possibility of improving their lot.
Citizenship was at once granted to those immigrants
with a residence of more than 10 years who wanted to become
Panamanian citizens. New immigrants had to comply with ad-
ditional conditions such as exercising a profession in sci-
ence, art, or industry; or by possessing some real estate
or active capital.
vii
Article 19 stood as an example of a nation who inten-
ded to respect every human right. It said, "There will be
no slaves in Panama. Anyone who, as a slave, enters the
territory of the Republic will be free." 5
The second Constitution was published in November 22,
1940. It contained fundamental changes regarding immigrants.
No longer did it aspire to protect the welfare of all of Pa-
nama's inhabitants nor guarantee their freedom. It declared
itself responsible for the well-being of Panamanian citizens
exclusively.
One can deduce from its provisions, that the new Cons-
titution was the product of a national disposition which tend-
ed to be reactionary against immigration. Panamanians were
fearing an attack on their traditions and sacial structure.
The restrictive measures were especially directed towards the
English-speaking, W e st-Indian Blacks who had migrated into
Panama mainly on four different occassions since 1850.
The Constitution defined "prohibited immigration" (immi-
gracion prohibida) as: Elacks whose language was not Spanish;
•yellows 1 , and those originating from India, Asia Minor and
North Africa. The best these people could hope for was res-
tricted citizenship. Furthermore, the Panamanian-born off-
spring of at least one parent being of prohibited immigra-
tion, whose race was black and non-Spanish speaking, was
denied his or her citizenship. Unless there was * substantial
'
proof that he had lived under the Republic's jurisdiction
viii
during his childhood and adult years, the Panamanian of non-
Spanish speaking black parents could not aspire to consider
himself a citizen. Only the President of the Republic, had
the power to change his status. The request of these Pana-
manian-born for prospective citizenship had to be processed
within the first three months after the 1940 Constitution be-
came effective.^
This contrast of attitudes between both constitutions
may seem peculiar. A review of the laws and statutes on im-
migration passed by the National Assembly, will reveal the
underlying reasons for the change. It will show the process
as a slow but constant one, which grew as a result of in-
creasing nationalistic tendencies. The immigration legisla-
tion also reflected the feelings of helplessness on the part
of Panamanian leaders who were unable to instill in the peo-
ple, the reaffirmation of their culture and traditions, and
to assure them of a stable national economy which would be
able to absorb the national native labor force.
Taking the 1940 Constitution as a reference point, it
is obvious that the group chosen as 'scapegoats' were the
Black-English speaking immigrants. The problem is not why
but how this group became the victim. It is important, there
fore, to analyze the reasons which motivated, on four
diff-
erent occassions, 1850,1880, 1904, 1938, the mass immigra-
tion of West Indian blacks to Panama. It is also
important
to analyze the socio-political attitudes and
economic con-
ditions during their residence
nian attitudes and conditions,
disclose the cause and effects
in Panamanian life.
in Panama, vis-a-vis Panama-
Both analyses will hopefully
of Black West Indian immigrants
CHAPTER I
ARRIVAL OF THE WEST INDIANS IN PANAMA
(1850-1914)
2The sugar plantations in the British West Indies had a
labor force which was composed of men and women brought in
from Africa as slaves. Once the slavery system was abolished
in 1832, the freed slaves faced a difficult political situa-
tion, a chaotic economy and a society which did not allow
them any upward social mobility. A look into these factors
will provide us with an understanding of the reasons for the
migration of West Indian blacks to Panama and the results of
their subsequent stay as permanent residents.
The anti-slavery movement succeeded in its persistent
efforts but the defeated landowners challenged the outcome
with measures which would make slaves' life as difficult as
before. Great Britain abolished slavery on April 17, 1832.
This decision did not reach the West Indies until 1834, dur-
ing which the Parliamentary Council approved the measure of
Freedom by Order. Thus, on August 1 of that year, the slaves
were freed and a system of apprenticeship was introduced by
the Emancipation Act."^"
The British government had to develop a plan which would
meet the demands of both groups pressuring it--the anti-sla-
very movement and the West-Indian planters. These two groups
opposed each other in essence. One, required the emancipa-
tion of slaves. The other, alleged slavery as essential to
the sugar production system. Already with the declaration
of the abolition of slavery, the movement which favored the
measure was satisfied in principle. The true problem was
zto satisfy the planters. Sugar production had to continue
to be profitable in spite of abolition. The only way this
could be achieved was to establish a work wage system that
would employ free labor. 2 Realizing that such a transition
would be too drastic, the anti-slavery leaders believed that
a system of apprenticeship would smooth the transformation.
The law which freed the slaves compelled them to serve
an apprenticeship of up to twelve years. It was later re-
duced to less time. They would be paid in wages and were
responsible for their own upkeep. They were required to pay
from their wages twice a year, a portion towards the price
of their own freedom. The British government granted the
planters approximately from $15 to $20 million pounds in loans
which were to be redeemed by the slaves, not the planters.
These concessions were made so as to maintain the support
of the colonists and West-Indian merchants which depended up-
on immediate compensation in order to c^rry out the emanci-
3pation program.
The administration in Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad
had many difficulties in reaching a common agreement to re-
structure the Colonial government in the aftermath of eman-
cipation. These islands now faced economic disaster. No
governor was able to come with a feasible solution. To com-
pound the problem, the planters in their disappointment tried
to obstruct in every way possible the rules imposed almost
overnight. 4 This lack of unity contributed to the restive-
4ness of the former slaves who, unable to earn their living,
had to work for a miserable wage. They hoped at first to buy
land, but reality changed their dream into a nightmare. L*nd
prices were too high and a heavy investment was necessary in
order to make the fields productive.
Another problem for the freed slaves was the overpopu-
lation of all the islands. For example, Barbados, with 166
square miles, had to support a population of 193,000 which
gave a density of 1,163 to the square mile. 5 Table I indi-
cates the density for the other islands.
TABLE I
Population Density"*"
1850
Barbados 1,163 per square mile.
British Guayana 1,700 " " "
Grenada 665 "
Guadaloupe 442 "
Tobago 241 "
Trinidad 229 "
I Eric Williams. The Nep;ro in the Caribbean .
Washington D.O.: 1942.
A census in 1851 gave the population of Barbados as
135,939 with the following classifications:
Whites 15,824
Colored & half-castes . . . .30,059
Blacks 90,056
The labor market was overstocked, and the land was
scarce and high priced. Nevertheless, small proprietors of
less than five acres increased, from 1830's to 1851, from
51,100 to 3,537. Overcrowded conditions tended to keep the
laboring population in a subservient position. The profes-
sions of emancipated blacks created a kind of middle class
composed of small landed proprietors, mechanics, merchants,
clerks, businessmen and artisans. They were reluctant to
become wage earners on the plantations which they considered
tyrannical .
^
Trinidad in 1851, counted 69,000 inhabitants. In 1858,
there were 80,000, of which 50,000 were Creoles of African
descent. After the emancipation, the planter established a
system of lower wages and more work for the freed field work-
ers. This did not have favorable results for the freed blacks,
as a high percentage of field laborers had become small land-
owners who worked on the plantations on a part time basis
to complement their income. The wage system provoked them
to bring up their children as traders or mechanics.
Jamaica's socio-economic conditions were more outstandl
ing than those of the other islands. Three different cen-
suses placed the black population at 380,000 in 1834, at
361,657 in 1844, and at 350,000 in 1860. In 1834, 320,000
slaves were liberated. Only 45,000 of them had any educa-
tion and formed a group of tradesmen. 50,000 of them were
engaged in the tillage of the soil. These figures include
the small proprietors. In 1860, 20,000 worked for the su-
gar estates; 10,000 as domestics and 3,000 in the public
works
.
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6As it appears, the desire for social mobility, which
was common to these large populations of West-Indian Blacks,
proved their ability to survive the slave status and to look
for a better opportunity as soon as they were emancipated.
It was not an easy goal to achieve. So far, the socio-eco-
nomic conditions constituted by their environment was an al-
most insurmountable obstacle. The wages were low, and the
work was exhausting, most of all for the children who, in-
stead of receiving good education, had to go to the fields
as soon as possible.
The reasons of migration are easily understood after
the study of the conditions that preceeded and followed e-
maneipation. The emphasis in the three islands of greater
population does not exclude the others: Tobago, Grenada and
British Guaya.na. The emigration from these islands was less
in number, but showed the same trends as in the others.
It was very difficult for the planters and the white
population as a whole, to accept the emancipation of their
slaves. It was much more difficult to accept the freed men
as part of their society. Race distinctions were perhaps
more strictly observed now that the black man was also a Eri-
cs
tish subject. At best, there were some colonists who felt
that the blacks owed them everlasting gratitude for having
been granted their freedom. Others, the majority, who ulti-
mate purpose was to maintain the status-quo in spite of e-
mancipation, employed the system of lower wages to obtain
7more work from the freed field workers. This strategy con-
tributed to keeping the laboring population in a subservi-
ent position.
Once they had achieved emancipation, the freed men had
no knowledge of any occupation other than working the soil,
one of the objectives of the apprenticeship system was to
train the former slaves in different trades so as to prepare
them to be more independent. Another reason was to supply
a more diversified labor force. Unfortunately, the system
of apprenticeship did not meet its expectations, although
there was a great increase of persons engaged in trades and
mechanical arts. Perhaps it was precisely such increase
which discouraged the continuation of innovation as more freed
men were reluctant to become wage earners on the plantations,
causing a large deficiency of field labor. This was espe-
Q
cially true of Barbados and Trinidad. In Jamaica, the last
colony to abolish slavery in 1833, the apprenticeship period
was drastically reduced to four years by the planters, leav-
ing approximately 320,000 freed men without any preparation
or training. Of the British West-Indies, Jamaica had the
lowest percentage of freed men in the trades or service oc-
cupation; the overwhelming majority engaged in field work.
10
The system of apprenticeship gave the government an
excuse to postpone indefinitely the establishment of the
popular education programs. In Jamaica for example, no con-
siderations had been made about popular education. In 1860,
8only 20,000 students, less the 6* of the total population,
were enrolled in private school. The planters were respon-
sible for the faults of policy and government which, besides
keeping the population in ignorance through the flat discour-
agement of education, hopelessly confronted a bankrupt eco-
nomy that drove the Creoles from the plantations. In Barba-
dos and Trinidad, there was an established system of educa-
tion although its deficiency helped to "prevent the circula-
tion of general intelligence
.
u11
On the whole, under the system of apprenticeship, the
Macks did not really learn to develop self-reliance in sol-
ving their own problems. Unfortunately, the public instruc-
tion system did not help them uphold their interests. 12
The freed man remained in his marginal status although he
now was a British citizen.
Another major obstacle to the smooth transition to e-
mancipation was the economic situation with which the colo-
nies were confronted. The colonists held the abolition of
the slave system responsible for the bankrupcy of their eco-
nomy. However, ^11 were faced with a difficult economic si-
tuation. Moreover, the sugar production monopoly which the
British colonies enjoyed, had been successfully challenged
by the growth of beet sugar in the French province of Landes,
and cane sugar in other French West Indies colonies and Cuba.
Other factors such ^s the slave system itself, made the colo-
nial economy* s recuperation impossible. This was partly due
9to the high costs of the slave system. In Jamaica, approx-
imately 200 sugar estates had been abandoned due to debt and
lack of capital, as far back as 50 years before emancipation
had taken place. Absenteeism was an important deterrent for
a profitable business. The exportations of sugar had decreas
ed from 150,000 tons in 1805 to 85,000 tons in 1833. Coffee
exports also suffered a loss of 50% from 1814 to 1832. More,
over, from 1815 to 1850, the price of- sugar fell approximate,
ly 75?S. 13 The persistent lack of capital after emancipation
contributed to an unceasing depression which made it almost
impossible to continue production, much less to pay freed
labor. To avoid the latter, an effort was made to encourage
the Hindu Coolie immigration to replace the new small land-
owners in the sugar fields. Such immigration caused an in-
crease in unemployment and a decrease in the part-time em-
ployment in which most of the freed laborers engaged to com-
plement their income during the 1840' s.
In Barbados and Trinidad, the planters followed a mis-
t
taken policy by refusing to give any inducement for the la-
borer to remain in the fields, such as higher wages or a
more liberal land tenure. 1 ^ They preferred to recruit cheap
labor from other parts of the British empire.
Consequently, there was an influx of East Indian Coolies
who came to replace the freed laborers on the field. After
their 3 year indenture period, the Coolies successfully com-
peted against the freed field workers as they underbid the
10
blacks in daily wages. Although only l/12th of the fertile
land was under cultivation, the reticent landed oligarchy
refused the concession of land to freed men as had been done
in Jamaica."^
Overpopulation also affected the island's economy. The
freed black had very little chance to attain economic secu-
rity in the West Indies. Under the circumstances, he could
not satisfy even his primary necessities. The black man
was forced to emigrate to look for higher salaries.
Secondary reasons for emigration were the political situa-
tion in the islands and a society which did not allow up-
ward social mobility for the freed men.^
On December 12, 1846, the United States signed the Ma-
llarino-Bidlack Treaty with New Granada's Liberal govern-
ment which guaranteed the latter 's sovereignty in the Isth-
mus in exchange for the unlimited rights to transit across
the territory. This agreement was beneficial to a politi-
cally weak Colombia, as it would no longer have to contend
with the continuous threats of the Panamanian separatist
movements. These motions toward autonomy had been taking
place in Panama not only as a reaction against the unceasing
party conflicts which caused a political crisis in Colombia,
but also as a manifestation of patriotic feelings which
16
sought for a corresponding political structure. Panama
separated from New Granada on three different occassions:
September 26, 1830, July 9, 1831, and November 18, 1840.
11
Although the IftthmUfl rejoined a peaceful Hew Granada Decem-
ber 31, 1841, its leaders did not abandon their goal of rin
independent Panama.
The 1846 negotiations assured the United States of an
advantageous position in Panama over the British for the
acquisition of control of the interoceanic waterways. The
contract included regulations concerning navigation, commerce,
and the "neutrality and maintenance" of the free transit
through the Isthmus, which decisively favored the United
States. Additionally, the government had the right to de-
vise and establish whichever means of communication it es-
teemed most convenient. Without doubt, this contract
would deeply affect Panama's socio-economic structure in
the succeeding years.
After its war with Mexico, from 1846 to 1843, the Uni-
ted States annexed the territory known as California and
came into possession of Oregon, thus fulfilling in great
part its goal of Manifest Destiny. In 1848, shortly after
the settlement of the Northwestern boundary, a Swedish ad-
venturer named John August Sutter, discovered gold in Call-
beginning the Gold Rush. The distance between the settled
states, especially those undergoing industrial development,
and the new possessions, made the latter inaccessible par-
1
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ticularly for administrative purposes. The water route
to California via Cape Horn was too long and time-consuming.
North Americans again looked upon Panama as the most
conve-
nient crossroad by which the United States might achieve
rapid communication between its east and west boundaries.
As a result, sudden and uncontrolled wave of foreigners in-
vaded Panamanian soil.
The excessive human traffic through the Isthmus demand-
ed the organization of steamship lines. The United States
Congress quickly authorized contracts for the establishment
of two steamship companies which would connect the east and
west coast of North America through Panama. George Law and
William H. Aspinwall took charge of the organization of the
routes. The steamship Falcon serviced the Atlantic Coast
from the ports of New York and New Orleans to the Chagres
River. The Pacific route was covered by the steamship Cal -
ifornia from California and Oregon to Panama City. The Isth-
mus became again the compulsory stop for the goldiggers.
There was a demand for coast to coast land transportation,
18
food and lodging, services which became very well paid.
The California Gold Hush gave new life to the Isthmus
which had become poor and obscure due to the unceasing civil
wars in their struggle for autonomy from Colombia. In the
years preceeding 1840, the Panamanian economy had experienced
a grave depression. The presence of the foreign element con-
tributed to the improvement of such situation. The rundown
appearance of Panama City changed completely in less than
four years. Old houses were restored and new ones were built
Foreigners from all parts of the world disrupted the quiet
13
atmosphere that had been characteristic of the Panamanian
setting. Although the contact with the foreigners was ex-
clusively "based on a business level, it brought to the sur-
face racial and cultural differences. Such dissimilarities
caused animosity among Panamanians against the newcomers who
spoke a different language and who mocked the native costumes,
19
customs, and religious expression. Another reason for the
Panamanian attitude towards the foreigners was due to the
fact that those who had come in the Pal con 1 s first voyage,
introduced the 'cholera morbus' in the seaport of Cruces in
1848. The lack of sanitary conditions due to the uncontroll-
ed massive immigration, caused the disease's rapid propagation
throughout the Isthmus, resulting in an epidemic.
On December 28, 1848, New Granada granted a concession
to the Pacific Steamship Company for the building of a rail-
road across the Isthmus of Panama. A contract was drafted
in 1849 between John Lloyd Stephens and Henry Chauncey, would-
be organizers of the Panama Railroad Company, and the govern-
ment of Colombia. The builders were hardpressed for time
as
the Gold Rush endeavours were surpassing any record
of past
output. The demand for a new and faster means
of transpor-
tation had made the building of a railroad a
necessity. Such
construction demanded a large labor force which
Panama was
unable to supply. Those in charge of
recruitment began to
promote the immigration of labor to the
Isthmus.
In 1850, the Panama Railroad Company
hired one thousand
14
Chinese from Canton to start work on the construction of the
line. However, due to illness, chronic melancholy and other
factors such as their addiction to opium, the Chinese' stay
in Panama was of short duration. This first group of immi-
grants was prejudicial to the Company as the majority deser-
ted their work on the railroad as often as possible and "had
to be rounded up by the police and sent back to work". 20
Those who were in charge of the construction, Misters Trau-
wine and Totten, made a contract with the Royal West Indian
Fail Steam Packett Company so that it would transport large
numbers of laborers from the Caribbean to Panama for a mini-
mal fee.
The demand for paid labor in Panama offered very good
opportunities, especially to the West Indians. The unfavor-
able situation which they confronted in their respective is-
lands induced their immigration to the Isthmus. Prom being
farmers and rural people, they became laborers in construc-
tion and industry, a change which they welcomed. The West
Indian migrant laborer proved to have better work capacity
than the Chinese. Although W©st Indians found a different
political organization in Panama, the socio-economic oppor-
tunities which it offered were much better than in their
places of origin.
The construction of the railroad began in August of 1850
with a labor force of three hundred workers
gathered from
Ireland, India, England, France, Germany,
Austria, the West
15
Indies, Colombia, Costa Rica and Panama. Pour months later,
the number of employees had risen to more than one thousand.
The labor force continued to increase during the four years
of construction, from 1850 to 1854, as it had during the first
four months. The total working force was seven thousand men
by the completion of the construction. Although the West
Indian group was not numerically important, it proved to be
the most adaptable to the climatic and working conditions.
As other groups of immigrants decreased due to illness, the
Vest Indians replaced them. 22
At the beginning of the railroad construction in 1850,
the Colombian Conservative President had been replaced by a
Liberal whose platform included, specifically, opposition
to the continuation of slave traffic that had been favored
by the former government in spite of emancipation. This
attitude did not mean a radical change towards the incorpor-
ation of black people into the social structure of Panama.
Although the initiative to open the doors to West Indian
immigration in Panama was in the United States' hands . The
local attitudes made it clear that these immigrants, like the
others, had to restrict their ambitions. The West Indians
soon sensed this opposition and isolated themselves in order
to protect their traditions and language. ' Besides, many
who thought to establish themselves as tradesmen, joined
others who considered Panama as a transitory home where they
could earn some money to buy land in their own country.
16
The principal handicap was not color nor race but lan-
guage. As they spoke English, it was impossible for them to
send their children to the Panamanian public schools which,
aside from this inconvenience, were considered inferior to
the British system. The community organized private schools.
Another handicap was the loyalty of these immigrants to their
British costumes. The Panamanians interpreted this attitude
ac resistance to the national institutions, norms and speech. ?4
Finally, this first generation of Vest Indian immigrants
had left one chaotic political situation for another. The
high wages they were enjoying cane from North American com-
panies, thus, their interest was to work as much as possible
and, for the moment, to put aside any close contact with
Panamanians and their society.
In spite of the United States' priority over the Isth-
mian traffic and its means of transportation, New Granada
granted a concession to Prance for the building of the Pa-
nama Canal in 1876. In 1800, the building concession was
transfered to Count Ferdinand D'Lesseps, who had also brought
the rights to the Panama Railroad Company. He later merged
both properties into one Company, the Compaignie Universelle
du Cnnal Interoceanique , which declared itself bankrupt in
180?. Five years later in 1034, a private French Company
named Cornpai^nie Nouvelle acquired all the rights to the
Prench Canal project until 1904. The latter was organized
25
mainly for the purpose of securing a buyer of the
assets.
17
The first company accepted workers from the We st Indies
because they had proven to he more adaptable than other mi-
grant laborers during the railroad construction. During its
operations (construction) a second massive West Indian immi-
gration took place in Panama, affecting again the numerical
as well as the racial composition of the Isthmus. Jamaica
was the chief source of labor supply followed by Barbados,
St. Lucia and Martinique. The following figures indicate the
high proportion of V.'est Indian workers: in 1884, more than
half of the 19,000 workers employed by the Panama Canal Com-
p?ny or the Compai^nie Universelle were West Indians. In
1885, among 12,875 laborers under contract, 9,000 came from
Jamaica. In 18888, out of 22,000 workers, 19,800 originated
from the West Indies. B e cause of the economic disaster due
to the Canal Company's bad administration, the cholera and the
yellow fever that killed about 16,000 workers, compelled D'Les-
sep B to abandon his project. When the French Company failed,
many immigrants returned to their native countries. Those
who chose to remain in Panama tried to adapt their living
con-
ditions to the host country's way of life. They found
jobs in
the railroad company. Others, engaged in
subsistent agricul-
ture in the small farms they had acquired
along the railroad
line. Still others, moved to rur*l
communities for farming
and gradually became part of them.
Another Frenchman, Philli?pe Bunau-Varilla
formed a
company, to take charge of the canal
enterprise until he
18
was able to mastermind the treaties by which all the rights
to the railroad and canal project passed to the government
of the United States. This development was not a surprise,
Having gained an unusual strategic position in the Caribbe-
an after the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States
needed a canal. In 1902, that nation's Congress passed the
Spooner Act, authorizing the purchase of the rights and as-
sets from the new French Company, and the negotiation of a
treaty with Colombia. A proposed canal treaty signed by the
United States and Colombian foreign ministers, John Hay and
Dr. Thomas Herran in 1903 was rejected by the Colombian con-
gress on the grounds that it was a menace to national sov-
ereignty. Hoping to take advantage of the situation, the
Panamanian State Assembly decided to make Colombia's veto the
immediate cause for declaring national independence. Corres-
pondingly, the United States offered its support to the Pa-
namanian cause in exchange for the would-be nation's ap-
proval of a treaty similar to the Eerran-Kay. Panama claim-
ed its national autonomy from Colombia on November 3, 1903.
In the meantime, Phillippe Bunau-Varilla worked out his treaty,
independently of the Panamanian delegation already in Washing-
27
ton and succeeded in imposting his views anc! conditions.
As a result, in 1904, the French transferred the rights of
the concession to the United States government in exchange
for $40,000.00.
19
The new administration of the Canal took advantage of
the presence of 700 West Indian workers who had been under
contract to the French companies for the construction of the
canal and the maintenance of the railroad. Immediately, la-
bor recruiting agents started to import other workers from
different countries. The following census taken in 1906 gives
the origin and numbers of those workers:
Spaniards S 222.^
-reeks
! lJlOo!
Italians 2,000.
Colombians 1,500.
West Indian 3o)oOo!
In 1910, there were 5,000 Europeans and 28,000 West In-
dians working on the canal. In 1913, at the peak of employ-
ment, there were 44, 711 unskilled workers, about 40,000 of
which were West Indians. J Unlike the French administration,
the North Americans established distinctions related to sal-
aries, lodging, and medical services between white United
States citizens and unskilled Europeans and West Indians.
The first group was paid in gold, enjoyed comfortable hous-
ing and good medical care. The second group was paid in sil-
ver and received second class medical attention. In spite of
its inferior quality and conditions, the housing facilities
available, could not meet the silver employees' demand. Some
governors of the Canal Zone like Chester Harding and M.Li
Walker petitioned Congress to increase living quarters for the
employees of the Can^l Zone. However, on the whole, it seemed
that the North American Canal administration shunned the res-
20
ponsibility of providing decent shelter for the workers,
leaving it to the Panamanian government. This attitude
indirectly opened the way to the exploitation of the work-
ers by the owners of tenement housing in the country. The
rents were sky-rocketing. The poor sanitation facilities
created numerous health problems for the West Indians living
in Panama which also contributed to the atmosphere of op-
position to the country. When Congress was close to grant-
ing $1,300,000 for a project to house 16,000 workers and
their dependents in the Canal Zone in 1916, the Panamanian
landlords, by lobbying in Washington D.C., were able to
bury that bill on the pretext of the loss of prospective
30income from the immigrants' rents.
As the building of the Canal was coming to an end,
some workers had to be laid off. The administration offer-
ed to pay all transportation and to guarantee repatriation,
if desired, to those who had been v/orking for more than 500
labor days. 0n c e the excavations of Corte Culebra were fi-
nished in October 1913, about 10,000 West Indian workers
were laid off. A^out 50% of them found work in the banana
plantations of the United Fruit Company in Pocas del Toro;
"^l
a northwestern province of Panama/ The other 5,000 re-
mained in the terminal cities of Panama and Colon, hoping
to find jobs in the Canal Zone where they would be prefer-
red because they spoke English. In the next chapter we will
learn how being unemployed in Panama affected the process
21
of West Indians' integration into society.
Thus, the Canal had become a reality in spite of a
history of complicated problems. From then on, Panama
had to face not only North American interference but also
the consequences of a large group of West Indians, who had
decided to stay and take advantage of the benefits promised
them by the 1904 Constitution. The transformation of the
Isthmus into an international crossroad gave it consider-
able importance and an opportunity to reaffirm its posi-
tion as an independent nation. The participation of the
West Indians in the construction of the Canal was their
biggest contribution to Panama. Nevertheless, in the years
to come they found little acceptance there.
FOOTNOTES
PREFACE:
1
E. Faorega (ed.), Gonstit uciones de la Republics
Panama de 1904, 1941 y 194^7 (Panama: A.l. de "fublir*-"
ciones 1969 )
.
2
Ibid., p. 9, 11
3
Ibid., p. 13
4
Ibid., p. 53-56
CHAPTER I;
1
D.J. Murray, The West Indies and the Development ofColonial Government : ldOi-13'54 (Oxfordi: iilnrp^nr, v^.,:
1365), p. 192, 201.
2
Ibid., p. 195
3
Ibid., p. 203
4
Ibid., p. 205-207
5
Eric Williams, The ffegroes in the Caribbean
. (Washing-
ton: 1942).
6
Ibid., p. 47
7
William Grant Sewell, The Ordeal of Free Labor in
the British West Indies (London and flew York: Harper and
Brothers, 1861 J, p. t 254.
23
8
Ibid., p. 67
9
Ibid., p. 44, 61, 113
10
Ibid., p. 245, 254
11
Ibid., p. 47, 120 241
12
Murray, The Ve st Indies. . . , p. 218
13
Sewell, The Ordeal of Free Labor. . .
, p. 232-233,
236, 240
14
Ibid., p. 56
15
Alfred Radford, Jottings on the West Indies and
Pan?ms (London: William Y/hitely Printers, 1886), p. 2T8
16
Ricardo J. Alfa.ro, El General Tomas Herrera (Bar-
celona: Imprenta de Henrich y Co., 1909) Mensaje del Ge-
neral Herrera Presidente del Estado Libre del Istmo al
Consreso Extraordinario de 1841.
17
Geor£ia I. Jimenez, Panama in Transition: Period 1849
1940 (New York: Columbia University, 1953, Ph. P. Thesis),
p. 59
18
Ibid., p. 136
19
Ibid., p. 61-62
20
John H . Kimble, The Panama Route. 1848-1869 (Cal-
ifornia: University of California Press, I'm), p. 193-
24
21
Yolanda Murgas, Historia del ferrocarrif de Panama(Panama: Universidad de Panama, 1966)
, p. 52-5$.
22
Ibid., p. 67
23
George Westerman, The Problems of West Indian Off-
springs in Panama: A study of Relationships between Ethnic
and Cultural Groups in a Cosmopolitan Setting (Panama: l°-44),
p. 116
'
24
Ibid., p. 126
25
Jimenez, Panama in Transition . . .
, p. 70
cL D
Gerstle Mack, The land Dividec (New York: 1944), p
338-39.
27
Dr. Prospero Melendez, Panama y el Canal (Panama:
February, 1961), p. 4-6
28
Javier Jimenez, Imrr.i^racion a Panana _ desde 1904
Panama: Universidad de Panama, 1963 3 , p. 63-64
29
Westerman, Problems of West Indian Offsprings
p. 74
• • >
30
Ibid., p. 106
31
Jorge Arosemena, Los Panameflos Ne^ros descendientes
de Antillanos: un caso de mar^inalid ad social? (Panama:
Nov., 1974), p. 57.
CHAPTER II
IMPACT 0? WEST INDIANS IN PANAMA
(1914-1940)
26
There are three facets which immigrant groups and their
host societies undergo, in the process of integration: ac-
ceptance, adaptation and reaction. The first warrants a
certain degree of assimilation of the customs of each group
involved. The second, implies a combination of the charac-
teristics of each culture in the social attitudes of the
groups. The third, may be manifested in the emergence of
anti-transcultural movements, due to the social oppression
of the immigrant group, or the effects on both from the ac-
ceptance of foreign cultural characteristics
.
1
An unusual experience occurred in Panama with its larg-
est group of immigrants, the West Indians. Little progress
was made in the process of acceptance. Adaptation proved
difficult, as the immigrants tried to preserve intact their
original cultural patterns, such as the folkloric traditions,
music, religion and to a lesser degree, their language.
The social integration of the W e st Indians became a problem
because, not wanting or being unable to 'absorb' the na-
tional culture, they chose to live outside of it. On the
other hand, a cultural phobia in the part of the Panamanian
people, created a permanent opposition to any foreign in-
fluence, inciting the defense of their culture rather than
race, against the possible effects on the language, customs
and ideas of the country. After considering the viewpoints
of both groups at the end of the Canal construction, Chap-
ter II wil deal with the West Indian's integration within
21
Panamanian Society in its socio-cultural
, economic and
political aspects, respectively.
To immigrants the Isthmus offered the vision of a
new country, but Panama, although undergoing a stage of
transition, had already developed a personality of its
own. Its culture was the result of Spanish traditions,
French inspirations and some North American immitations.
The country's upper class reflected most fully these trends.
The lower class was composed of native blacks, Indians,
mulattoes and mestizos that found a common link in the
Spanish culture. As a result, the latter was enriched with
the contributions received from the influx of these dif-
ferent groups.
The language, Spanish, also reflected the strong in-
fluence of foreign elements in the difference of pronun-
ciation, word meanings and the anglicisms used among the
masses in Panama. Roman Catholicism was the official re-
ligion. However, its followers added some of their pagan
traditions to the religious rituals giving it a sense of
mysticism and superstition. The country's artistic forms
of expressions were mostly african-influenced , especially
3
the folk dances such as the tamborito and cumbia.
The geographic location and history of Panama gave
its inhabitants contrasting feelings of submission and
independence. As a semi-isolated province of Colombia,
Panama preserved its social and rural family structure.
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Once the first construction period began in 18 5 0 such struc-
ture underwent many unforseen changes. The struggles to sep-
arate from Colombia were legendary. Nevertheless entangle-
ments with other nations, especially the United States, fos-
tered a passive acceptance of economic and political depend-
ence, and generated a condlict of national identification.
The Panamanians were able to accept some immigrants
such as the French and Spaniards with whom they had much in
common. Their latin culture and language made them welcome.
However, their Hispanic social structure was challenged by
the West Indians, the most numerous but not necessarily ho-
mogeneous groups of immigrants.
We st Indians also had a cultural personality of their
own. On a racial level, sensitivity to shades of color had
great meaning for them. Due to their social differences,
the island of origin caused many frictions, most of all bet-
ween Barbadians, Jamaicans and Trinidadians
.
4 These internal
conflicts were obstables towards unity against the injustices
they had to face. Although different among themselves, a
common name would be legally assigned to them; "Antillanos"
.
The Vest Indians believed that this designation in the ci-
vil registry made them second class citizens in their ef-
forts to become permanent residents of Panama.
As a consequence, West Indians immigrants felt inse-
cure as Panamanians. They drew strength from grouping to-
gether and reaffirming their British-based social and cul-
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tural heritage. They prided themselves in being British
citizens and remained loyal to that government. Unfortu-
nately, the indifferent attitude of the British whites
toward their black compatriots placed the West Indian com-
munity in Panama at a disadvantage. The white English ad-
vocated the custom of racial discrimination, injuring the
loyal black citizens who, often times, expressed their will-
ingness to defend the British Empire 'with their lives if
necessary 1 .
^
In 1904, Panamanians had accepted We st Indians and
through their constitution, had given them the opportunity
to become citizens. Panamanians interpreted the West In-
dians affinity to England as an indication of their con-
tempt for local norms. They had witnessed through the years,
the subordination of We st Indians as human beings and as
employees of the Panama Canal Company in spite of having
a double social standard in the Canal Zone. West Indians
preferred the United States rule to the Panamanian because
it offered better economic conditions for the time being.
For example, in 1938, the Panama Canal W e st Indian Employees
Association (P.C.V/.I.E. A. ) requested that they be consi-
dered "de facto" citizens of the United States though not
''de jure", in view of the services rendered to the Panama
Canal Zone Government. ' Now that they were living in Pa-
nama, they isolated themselves from the Panamanians. Lo-
yalty to England, preference for the United States and I-
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solation from Panamanians affected We st Indians in a nega-
tive way in different levels such as: Their children's edu-
cation, their position as workers within the country's la-
bor force and in the Canal Zone, as well as their legal sta-
tus within the Isthmus. This study will concentrate later
on the legal aspects provoked by West Indian attitudes.
Education was a factor contributing to W e st Indian i-
solation. In the Canal Zone their children received a se-
cond-rate education which prepared them for the local job
openings for blacks. The schools did not provide them with
a professional training until 1946, when two vocational
schools were opened for blacks.
W e st Indian children did not learn about Panamanian
ghistory or geography in any public schools. The families
who lived in Panama did not send their children to public
schools; instead, they enrolled them in small private ones
which were usually sponsored by various churches. They
were taught English, history and geography, the pound sys-
tem and how to count British currency with complete lack of
9
concern that they were residing in Panama. Although their
schools were deficient, the educated immigrant played an
important role in the field of education in Panama. West
Indians established private tutoring as a popular method
for learning English. As early as July 12, 1893, Samuel T.
Bailey founded the first West Indian private school
in Co-
lon. It was named Parochial School in Christ
Church. In
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In 1904, Dr. J.T. Barton founded the Panama Private Academy
at Plaza Herrera, in Panama city, where evening classes
for a commercial school were also held. The concept of
the private school system was later readily adopted by
Panamanian educators.
Language was an important obstacle to rapid integra-
tion. Neither the Canal Zone Schools nor the private
schools taught Spanish. Inability to speak Spanish Pre-
vented V e st Indian children from attending the country's
public schools. The tradition of organization, sociabi-
lity or social behavior, family life and the practice of
Chritian principles to which they had been subjected dur-
ing the British Colonial administration in the West Indies,
were very much in contrast with those of Panama. As would
be expected, both groups considered themselves far removed
from each other's ethnic, religious and linguistic natures.
Traditionally, belonging to a solidly established
'God-fearing' family was very important to the V/est Indians.
As a restricted immigrant group, their family relations were
very much affected. An inbalance in sex ratio promoted
marriage with Panamanian women. An imbalance in ages caused
problem between the immigrant generation and their children
because of the lack of a middle age and young adult con-
tingency in an already top heavy age pyramid.
11 Both of
these imbalances, couple with the contrasting ways of life
and social structure of the Isthmus, overpowered
the tra-
10
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ditional W est Indian family patterns. Parents "born, in
the islands found it almost impossible to maintain their
culture. Thier children were socially marginal and lack-
ed identification with either culture. John and Mavis
Biesanz have summed up the W e st Indian youth's identifi-
cation conflict:
(The young W e st Indian) scorns his parents' Union
Jack and Royal family... admired Eing Crosby, lena
Home and American material culture ... likes the
free and easy Panamanian life and its comparative
racial mobility. (He) has little sense of patriot-
ism (and) feels he belongs nowhere. 12
Lack of advanced education led to a negative personal
attitude and social behavior of young West Indians. In
1955, the Biesanzs reported that this group was very in-
clined towards promiscuity, which resulted in an illegiti-
macy rate of approximately 71%.
There were four commonly practiced family models a-
mon^ Vest Indians. Less than 25% of the marriages were
monogamous, had some degree of economic stability such as
a house or plot of land, and rigidly observed Christianity,
yore than 25% lived in faithful concubinages. There was
also the maternal or grandmother family, where the mother's
parents assumed the role of the child's father. The last
form was call the 'keeper family', a superficial or un-
stable relationship between the parents, in which the
mother worked to help support the children. Although
most men shunned the legal and economic
responsibility of
'
a family, they were more likely to get
married after achiev
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ing some economic security, than their Panamanian counter-
parts. ' (See Table II).
The differences in social classes among West Indians
derived from occupational and behavioral factors. The up-
per class consisted of professional people who had a high
social status in the islands, the educated blacks, who
became professionals and looked for positions in the va-
rious government offices, ministers of the established
churches, journalists and teachers. Those British West
Indians who enjoyed a high social status back home, strove
to be equally accepted as members of Panamanian society.
^
The middle class included church and lodge leaders
who were loyal to their cultural and religious traditions
in spite of a low earning power. They tried to give their
children at least high school education. In many ways,
the middle-class blacks collaborated with the government
policies, as an obvious proof of achieving success through
persistent effort. They believed that men of superior
character and ability could arrive at positions of power
without limitations as to race. Their example persuaded
working class blacks to accept the status nuo of the group
within Panamanian society.
15 The lower class consisted of
menial laborers. Their way of life was undisciplined.
Most engaged in promiscuous and irresponsible in
education
but participated enthusiastically in gambling,
horseracing,
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or the lottery.
As a whole, due to their small salaries, the We st In-
dians realized that they would not be able to provide for
their families in case of illness or death. During the
early 1920' s, they organized fraternal and benevolent so-
cieties, forming a cooperative security against becoming a
public burden. These organizations gave such positive re-
sults that they served as an incentive for the beginning of
the adaptation of a social security program on a national
basis. The field of sports and music in Panama also re-
ceived substantial contributions from the West Indians,
whose deep religious convictions turned their churches in-
to social centers for the provision of recreation, educational
programs and musical expressions.
During the depression years, West Indians began to i-
dentify even more with North American ideals. They tried
to be more economically active in order to acquire the com-
modities North Americans possessed in the Canal Zone, such
as clothes, cars, etc. Unfortunately, their 'image' suffered
in Panamanian society as they tried to immitate the other
intruder.
During the early 1900* s, some West Indians discon-
tinued their work, in the Canal Zone and moved into Panama
City and Colon on a permanent basis. Many of them had left
their work, partly because of the severities of the laws to
which they were subjected there. In turn, these workers
TABLE II
CARRIAGE PERCENTAGES FOR VEST INDIANS OVER 15
YEARS OP AGE IN THE CANAL ZONE AND PANAMA!
f
-CANAL ZONE PANAMA
FEMALES
:
' SINGLE: 25% 50%
MARRIED: 50% 23%
MALES 50% 50%
SINGLE: 43^ 20%
MARRIED:
NOTE: 25%, of blacks live in consensual union.
SOURCE: John and Mavis Biesanz, The People of Pa-
nama . (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1955), p. 316 (Based on 1940 Cen-
sus figures )
.
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successfully sought employment as plumbers, firemen, carri-
age and Trolley car conductors and even as policemen in
the national territory. 18
Most West Indians did not take advantage of the oppor-
tunity to acquire farm lands which Panamanian law had made
available to immigrants. Although the majority had been
farmers in the islands, they preferred to live in the ur-
ban centers. One explanation was that they had come to a-
void farm work for what it reminded them. Another was that
land was not accessible to them as it was to other settlers. 15
Still more important, living in the cities allowed them to
maintain close contact with other West Indians, giving them
a feeling of security and an opportunity to preserve their
customs and tradition.
After the completion of the Canal in 1914, the large
labor force employed during its construction was no longer
needed. The Canal's maintenance work could not absorb the
31,000 West Indian workers. Once more, victims of unemploy-
ment, these people faced the necessity of emigrating in
search of new jobs elsewhere or competing for them in Pana-
ma. A number of them retired from the Canal Company and de-
cided to settle in Panama with their small disability pay-
ments. M0st had lost family ties and friendships in their
islands of origin. 20 This situation caused a noticeable
increase of the population in the national territory, part-
icular^ in Panama City and Colon.
21 (See Tables No. Ill
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and IY).
The W e st Indians, now 'new* residents, represented
an antagonistic sector in the national process of revindi-
cation in the 1920' s. Their lack of interest in the nation's
problems had adverse consequences. The most significant
one would "be the development of a persistently progressive
racist-oriented policy, most of all nurtured in the econo-
micly powerful sectors of Panamanian society "but also in the
government, manifested especially through its legislative
22
measures
.
During the 1920' s and early 1930' s government officials
gave Vest Indians the opportunity to settle into vacant plots
of lands in the outskirts of the capital. In doing so, these
officials tried to make the 'Antillanos' presence less ob-
vious in business centers. Additionally, these politicians
defended the landlords' implicit agreement restricting avail-
able housing for these immigrants to certain areas in Pueblo
:iuevo,.Rio Aba jo, Parque Lefevre and Ciudad Radial. Although
the wooden houses had poor sanitary facilities other groups
of Canal Zone workers settled there, causing a
substantially
important wave of migration into the national territory.
West Indian migration became more acute when
mass unemploy-
ment took place in 1929 in the Canal Zone to
make way for
North American citizens who were left jobless during
the
depression in the United States.
25 The Canal Company's
lack of concern for their workers was
classified as dumping,
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since it forced the local unemployed labor to turn to a weak
and already overburdened host. 24
Panamanian regarded West Indians as a threat to their
well-being and also began to hold them responsible for the
national social ills. 25 Reacting to the national resentment
towards the West Indians, the government, which had proved
unable to provide jobs for its unemployed, used them as
'scapegoats 1 during the mid-1920 f s, to divert public atten-
tion. Not withstanding the profits made from the West In-
dians as consumers and accessible cheap labor, the general
feeling was that only expulsion from the national territory
would solve the socio-economic situation. The news media
contributed to reinforce this popular sentiment. Typical
was an editorial in the Panama-Weekly in 1924, which queried
Ape we going to stand aside and permit an in-
ferior unassimilable foreign element that is
objectionable from a sociological point of
view, to take advantage of the few jobs that
our native element could fulfill? 26
The West Indian immigrant incorporated himself to the
Isthmian economy as a consumer, the same way Panama had in-
corporated itself to the United States economy. As panama
became a consumer market for the United States, it could
not offer sufficient job opportunities for then, as the rate
of unemployment in the Canal Zone rose. Although the count-
rv had confronted this situation especially from 1839-1903
and from 1913-1915, the government officials still did not
39
attempt to establish programs of development in which the un-
employed immigrants and the national labor force could be in-
tegrated into the process of industrial growth. On the con-
trary, they insisted on maintaining a service economy over-
whelmingly beneficial to the economicly powerful sectors in
the government. Independently, an arbitrary system of gov-
ernment employment, further limited the V.'est Indian 'middle 1
or educated class as it rarely found occupational stability
in the public offices.
Panama developed disproportionally . The construction
and operation of the Canal reaffirmed the old national econo-
mic structure rather than helped its transformation. Three
different factors perpetuated the traditional economy. First,
the economic system was designed to exploit the geographic po-
sition of the Isthmus since colonial times. Now that the ca-
nal was finished, the profits would be unsurpassed. Second,
slow agriculture development, combined with high population
increase, provided cheap labor for the maintenance of the
Canal. Moreover, the exodus of small farmers
into the cities
precipitated the concentration of fertile lands in
the hands
of fewer plantation families (latifundistas ) .
Third, Panama
became a consumer market for the United
States' production
surplus and could not compete even in
principle.
The period from 1920 to 1930, was
one of economic ad-
justments for Par,ama. The favorable work
opportunities no
longer existed, but the search
for employment was still high.
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There were 467,459 inhabitants according to the 1930 Census,
with a population increase rate of 4.7% (See Table V & VI).
Panama had 'secured' two new markets for its domestic pro-
ducts after the construction period had ended selling to
ships in transit and to the Canal Zone itself. Cnce the Ca-
nal Company established fully stocked post exchanges, these
new markets slowly disappeared.
The Isthmus could not supply enough agricultural pro-
ducts for the rapidly growing population. Although the ex-
portation of preserved meats rendered handsome profits, cat-
tle owners did not improve or multiply their breeding stock
to meet the steadily increasing demand. Agricultural devel-
opment almost ceased as the economicly progressive chose to
concentrate on the service industries, while the fishing in-
dustry 'existed' practically for internal consumption pur-
, 27poses
.
Changes in the general conditions in Panama, during the
1920' s brought the West Indian question to surface. Not be-
ing able to find work in the Isthmus, Panamanian laborers
turned to the Canal Zone for employment. H0wever, the Pana-
ma Canal Company preferred the hiring of West Indians because
they were subjected to lower pay rates under the classifica-
tion of 'silver roll' workers. This policy incited the Pa-
namanians to denounce them as dangerous competitors. Inde-
pendently, these 'competitors' thought of Panama as a. refuge
from the discrimination of which they were victims in the
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BY RACE AND SEX
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TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION
ACCORDING TO PROVINCES AND POSITION HELD BY
EACH RACIAL GROUP
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Canal Zone. 8
While many Est Indians were put out of vork in 1929,
national labor representatives continued to fight for e-
qual employment opportunity for Panamanians in the Canal
Zone. In the midst of economic depression in 1936, an a-
greement was reached between Panamanian officials and Uni-
ted States Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, in which Pana-
ma was offered the advantage of having its citizens enjoy
a status of equality with the North Americans, for employ-
ment in the Canal Zone, 'when' or 'wherever' feasible. Thus
West Indians were further limited in work opportunities. 29
The restrictive economic measures concerning West In-
dians diminished their potential strength as the second
largest labor force in Panama and curtailed any open com-
petition from them in business or as workers. (See Table
No. VII). These measures were largely responsible for the
lack of development of a professional class among them. In
1944, there were only two doctors and three dentists of W e st
Indian descents.
Because of class distinctions, West Indians were unable
to cooperate as one group for economic purposes. Feelings
of distrust, between one social class and the other, dis-
sipated their collective strength. As a whole, middle class
West Indians engaged in the service enterprises. They were
usually owners of tailershope, liquor and novelty stores,
31
beauty parlors, dry cleaners, dress makers and the like.
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TABLE VII
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OP THE TOTAL GAINFULLY
OCCUPIED POPULATION TEN YEARS OP AGE AND OVER
BY POPULATION CLASSES
TOTAL MALE FEMALE PERCENTAGE
All Classes: 207,718 171,839 35,879 M. F.
Blacks
:
39,103 30,527 8,576 84.5 27. 0
Mestizos: 135,255 112,315 21,940 80.1 15. 8
White: 29,162 23,982 5,180 83.1 20. 1
Others: 5,198 5,015 183 90.6 13. 8
Source: George V/esterman. West Indian Offsprings in Panama :
A Study of Relationships between Ethnic and
Cultural Groups in a Cosmopolitan Setting
.
(Panama: 1944), p. 16
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The economic situation in Panama began to improve af-
ter 1937. The need to defend the Canal in view of growing
worl-wide belligerancy created multiple work opportunities
and a period of relative prosperity. The conflict between
Panamanians and West Indians did not subside as the Panama
Canal Company managed to persuade the National Legislature
to allow a fourth wave of these immigrant workers into the
country. Aside from intensifying the socio-economic con-
flict, the unexpected immigration caused an acute shortage
of housing in the terminal cities. The bonanza lasted for
a few years, until 1945, and its aftermath was very dama-
ging both to the West Indian group and to the socio-econo-
mic and political conditions of the Isthmus.
As Panamanian increasingly considered them to be a ne-
gative factor or influence in the economic life of the Is-
thmus, the West Indians participation as an interest group
within the local social structure decreased. West Indians'
integration as a socio-political interest group in Panama
did not take place, and their participation in the nation-
al politics was minimal. Constant mobility, economic in-
stability, and daily subordination by the Panamanian and
ITorth American cultures obstructed their ability to mani-
fest themselves as a political interest group with the gov-
ernment structure.
Since the 191C's and beginning with BelisariQ Porras'
candidacy for President, black leaders collaborated
with
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conventional politicians. They acted as intermediaries bet-
ween the politicians they represented and their community
in order to obtain its votes during election time. Panama-
nian politicians were aware that support or lack of it from
the V/est Indians community could be a decisive factor in an
electoral turnout. 32 Nevertheless, as a general rule, the
government did not take into consideration the importance of
West Indians' participation in its attempt to unify the Pan-
amanian people against United States's presence in the Canal
Zone. Additionally, it never considered them in the country's
decision making process. 33 However, some interaction with,
and integration to the Panamanian mainstream did occur. This
was manifested through the increase in enrollment of West
Indian offspring into the public schools. In their study,
John and Mavis Biesanz assert that third generation Vest In-
dian children felt 'thoroughly Panamanian' and 'took their
•7 1
citizenship very seriously'. * Integration was also evi-
denced in the emergence of professional and, to a small de-
gree, in political participation on an individual basis.
From the beginning of its Republican period, in 1903,
Panama, waged a struggle of revindication against the inter-
ventionist role of the United States in the country's in-
ternal affairs and its 'occupation' of the Panama Canal
Zone. Labor and student organizations, along with other
•politically progressive' groups, became the major spokes-
men for the Panamanian cause while denouncing United States'
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aggressive intervention in the country's affairs. Being
overexposed to the North American way of life, not to men-
tion the subjects of an acute economic domination, the
West Indian population as an interest group did not under-
stand or identify itself with Panama's struggle of Nation-
al liberation. As such, they were obstacles to develop-
ing Panamanian nationalism. This situation led to the per-
petuation of racist-oriented policies by the Panamanian
government.
The West Indians were a potentially important group
within the country's political situation, but their foreign
status counterbalanced their importance. The Panamanian
commercial elite emphasized this last condition directly
and openly. The United States foreign policy representa-
tives also made a point of it in a more subtle manner. The
presence of the West Indian working force in Panama meant
the expansion of an internal market which in turn, increased
the commercial activities and the selling of services in the
hands of the national commercial elite. On the other hand,
the superimposed presence of foreign labor force on its na-
tional counter part, guaranteed a division and the weakening
of the 'politicized' working masses in urban areas for the
United States. J
The national commercial elites continuously underlined
the fact that We st Indians were not only foreigners but
were also prohibited immigration ( imnirracion prohibida)
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to keep them as consumers, not as competitors. In doing so,
they indirectly checked the industrial development of the
country. The economic sector principally benefited from
the business made in the Canal and Free Trade Zones. Thus,
it was necessary to collaborate with the North American gov-
ernment to protect its interests. Article 136 of the 1904
Constitution granted the United States power to intervene
in the country's internal affairs. Such 'privilege' was
excercised during presidential elections to 'guarantee an
orderly process'. Gerardo Maloney and G e orge Priestly in
their work cn West Indian participation in national politics,
V.F. Goytia ( Bio^ra.fia de una Republics)
,
Santiago Kontero Z.
(Panama: su historia y su presente) , have classified such par-
ticipation as a breach of Panamanian sovereignity, as well
as sponsoring the continuation of power of the commercial e-
lites throughout the various so-called 'democratic adminis-
trations'. Interventions such as the following demonstrate
that the United States contributed in checking Panama's insti-
tutional development: Cn November 14, 1904, General Esteban
Huertas attempted to overthrow President Amador Guerrero.
The United States, through its Canal Zone government, de-
manded that the national government abolish its army and
establish a police force instead. Excercising its rights
granted in the 1904 Constitution, the Canal Zone government
intervened in the 1908 electoral process to sponsor Jose D.
Obaiafa's presidency. In 1914, United States established
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the border limits between Panama and Costa Rica in its White
Agreement (Fallo-Whlte
)
f nullifying Panama's previous agree-
ment (Fallo-Loubet). As a result, Panama lost the Valle
of Talamanca and Coto regions. That same year, United States
signed the Thorapson-Urrutia treaty with Colombia, which es-
tablished border limits between Colombia and Panama. The
latter, lost the Atrato River region to Colombia. After a
series of encounters between Panamanian police and North
American soldiers in the terminal cities, the United States
government issued a document (No. 245, October 15, 1916),
ordering the immediate disarmament of the Panamanian police
force. United States' occupation of Panama City and Colon
too": place in 1918 due to President Ciro Urriola's postpone-
ment of elections. Also, from 1918-1920, United States
troops invaded and occupied the province of Chiriqui in or-
der to 'protec' William Chase, a North American cilizen in-
volved in the assassination of Dr. Saturnino Perigault, gov-
37
ernor of that Province.
The United States also intervened when the economic in-
terests of the national elites were at stake. One case was
the mobilization of the United States troops to the national
territory to 'appease' two tenants' manifestations O'ovimi-
entos IncuilinsriQg) , in 1925 and 1932, against high rents.
Of all the protester, the We st Indian group was the most
affected. Although their opposition to the issue at hand,
was expressed in terms of conflicting commercial
character-
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istics, Maloney & Priestly defined their action with the
political term of "class struggle". 58
West Indians who achieved middle-class status were
considered community leaders. They concentrated mainly in
improving their followers* buying power while emphasizing
their role as consumers. These leaders did not attempt to
consolidate minority group consciousness among the West In-
dian population. George We sterman, Armando Fortune, Javier
Jimenez, and Maloney and Priestly, on the subject of West
Indian political participation, have accused them of sur-
rendering political loyalty in exchange for economic sta-
bility. This group's failure to express itself as a unified
political group during thirty years of compulsory interac-
tion with Panamanian society, made it vulnerable to the e-
mergence of a deep rooted reactionary nationalism whose ma-
jor exponent was Dr. Arnulfo Arias Madrid. From 1936 to
194C, he expressed such nationalism in the drawing of a po-
litical platform that was later interpreted as being a doc-
trine or theory which totally rejected the West Indians as
undesirables
.
Once the 'Panamenista 1 program, as it was called, had
been legislated through the enactment of the 1941 Consti-
tution, the W e st Indians were divided about its significance.
The majority considered the charter to be the final expre-
ssicn of the unfair treatment they had received, of their
economic and social oppression and of political ostracism
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due to race. Others wanted to reaffirm their native citi-
zen's status to prove that they were as Panamanians as the
rest. On the whole, there was widespread demoralization
among V/est Indians, as was seen through their restlessness,
poverty, juvenile delinquency and crime. 39
The social behavior and traditions of the islands,
were not only transferred to Panama but, as we have seen,
were inculcated upon the immigrants' Panamanian-born chil-
dren, in spite of the changes they suffered. Rather than
being an incentive for the development of their descendants'
favorable attitude toward the traditions of their country
of birth, the West Indian parents were largely responsible
for their children's total lack of identification to both
cultures.^ Actually, the radical difference between the
two cultures, made the process of adjustment difficult and
slow as we have tried to show. Whereas, the West Indian
did not. make good use of the early positive attitude of
Panamanians for social interaction. The latter, distrust-
ful of the former's cultural disparity, proceeded to cur-
tail its total assimilation.
The Panamanian government always lacked interest for
the establishment of programs such as in education, design-
ed to absorb the various immigrant groups into the national
community. Consequently, the first generation of immigrants
experienced conflict and disorganization. In general, not
only Panamanian society imposed certain social limitations
52
for West Indians but also the foreign interests that were
and are still active in the country. These factors contri-
buted to reduce the development or unification of the na-
'
tions's interest groups as an anti-imperialist force, in-
cluding the West Indians, which had been systematically sub-
jected to and affected by the United States economy. 41
Some writers have been aware of the reaction of West
Indians to acculturation. At the same time, they have under-
lined the attitude of the government towards these immigrants
George W e sterman acknowledges the peculiar situation of the
group that strengthened by its convictions of being super-
ior, would not accept a complete integration, in spite of
the advances offered by Panama. He underlines also, the be-
ginning of a systematic opposition to West Indians. First,
as an immitation of the treatment given to them by North
Americans and second, as a means to create a homogeneous
nation. However, it is important to stress that Westerman
looks at the Antillanos too favorably considering them more
as victims than as people who contributed to their own per-
secution. Felipe Escobar defends the right of any nation to
dictate its immigration policy. Nevertheless, he criticizes
as an anti-democratic procedure, the consideration of West
Indians as representatives of a different and inferior race
and not as those who had contributed so much to the country'
economy. Prospero Melendez explains the position of
the gov
eminent as the right answer to the problem created
by the
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West Indians. Their dedication for many years to a foreign
country, unabled them to be a living force in the country,
unabled them to he a living force in the country of their
choice. Moreover, he explains how North American's lack of
concern for them, once they were no longer useful, created
a problem for Panama, as their presence was a great burden
for the welfare institutions to which they had not contri-
buted. Maloney and Priestly insist mostly on the laboring
influence of West Indians. They argue that in Panama, the
trend was to ignore their presence and importance on account
of their close relations to North American policy. It would
take a long time to arrive at an official recognition or their
values as voters but they had to sacrifice their political
participation in exchange for economic stability. •'
This variety of criteria stresses the profile that can
be drawn from this chapter. As an uprooted conglomerate,
the West Indians had to make a choice. They had changed
hands. England had given them, together with their free-
dom, a distinct cultural background. The economic depen-
dence on the United States obliged them to silence their
relation to England and to partake of a new system of values.
This created an isolation in front of the country who was
the owner of the same zone where they were working. The
future appeared very uncertain, as the next chapter will
indicate
.
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*CHAPTER III
TRE LEGAL STATUS OF WEST INDIANS
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Until 1926 the religious and political tolerance which
had characterized Panama served as an incentive for immigra-
tion, especially from 1850 to 1904. The excessive flow of
people in transit and these who had gone to work on the rail
road, gave the appearance that racial, religious, social or
political discrimination did not exist. However, as early
as 1S42 there were regulations imposed which affected black
immigration. At that tine, its purpose was to check the im-
portation of slaves. As Hack settlement increased, Panama-
nian officials strongly believed that the risk was "being
fun that the ethnic differences would become stronger than
national feelings". 1
A.side from contradicting Panama's official stand, as
well as that of other nations, racial discrimination 'backed
by legislative measures, was a serious offense to human dig-
nity. In his BOCio-duridtc study of immigration, Nicolas
Pelgado states that Panamanian legislation since the beginn-
ing of the twentieth centiry was very specific about immigra
tion in certain aspects, 5ut showed no concern in others.
Immigrants had to settle fn Panama with their families in
order to be considered permanent residents. They would not
enjoy full civil or political rights even as citizens. They
could not voice their opixions nor participate in national
politics. On the other Y.m? , the legislation did not esta-
blish a process to find * common basis for a smooth coexis-
tence between ethnic and native groups, in spite of the dif-
re
ferences in language, customs or set of goals. According
to Delgado, this policy contributed to the corruption and
demoralization in the Public Administration. 2
Unfortunately, he did not expound on the important aspect of
legal racial discrimination and its implications for Pana-
ma's international image.
Felipe Escobar and George Westerman seem to agree on the
fact that racial prejudice and discrimination was not a Pana-
manian characteristic in principle, but was developed after
the French end North Americans 'intorduced' it during the
construction years. Nevertheless, they do agree with Del-
ado that government officials did great damage to the country
by illicitly allowing immigrants. These officials took ad-
vantage of the fact that there were no control measures to
check the influx of clandestine aliens into the country.
The liberal dispositions of the 1904 Constitution were out-
dated drastically and demanded a substantial reform, especial-
ly in its judicial aspects.
A general overview of the 1904 and 1941 Constitutions,
and of the laws and statutes^ reveals three different eras
in Panamanian politics regarding immigration. First, the
policy was open; later, some restrictions were made evident,
and finally, the attitude was to be negative. These changes
were evidenced in the handling of various aspects of legal
and clandestine immigration.
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During the late 1 900'e, Government officials believed
that the future of Panama depended on improving the agri-
cultural economy. In order to achieve this goal, they de-
cided to offer ample opportunities to Europeans familiar
with rural economic activities. The specifications requir-
ed for their entrance and the facilities the government of-
fered them give an idea of the legal provisions. On the
other hand, the modernization of the country through a rail-
road and a canal, demanded a large foreign labor force con-
trolled by the authorities responsible for those enterprises.
It was an imposed immigration which resulted in many problems.
In addition, the country had to face a clandestine immigration
which brought a new contingent of people and created differ-
ent problems.
Panama's increasing strategic and commercial importance
was attractive to foreigners. The government took legal pro-
visions to control this influx. Clandestine immigration
took place during the railroad and canal construction years
from 1850 to 1860, and from 1880 to 1914. These periods
coincided with the economic booms. At that time, it was
easy to enter Panama without being noticed. These immigrants
originated from the Caribbean and Colombia especially and
most were black. Many entered from the Pacific, temporarily
landing in the co*st town of Jaque and from there, going on
to Panama. City as if they were natives. Others crossed the
dangerous selvatic region of the Darien Mountains until
they reached the small Indian hamlets where they could find
temporary shelter. A third group came into the country
through Panama City and Colon as crew members or as stow-
aways of the ships that stopped in both harbors. These
illegal entries became so common that in the first two areas
above mentioned, the atio of foreigners to native Panamanians
5
was estimated as 2:1.
The fact that there was no body of legislation to deal
uniformly with this problem of illegal entry until 1941 had
serious implications for the country's economy and society.
Panama needed more people in its territory in order to pro-
gress, but they had to be of a kind that could contribute
to a normal prosperity. Unskilled laborers who entered il-
legally into the country competed with the natives and suc-
ceeded, in leaving up to 50,000 without jobs.^ Officials
had no legal instrument to check the influx of foreigners.
The forty different documents relating to this problem lack-
ed the reinforcement of a uniform law. Besides, many times
the normal process of each case met with the opposition of
some officers who found a way to amass a fortune by accept-
in-- bribes in exchange of an identity card ( cedula ) or other
n
document as proof of permanent residence. A general legis-
lative reform was urgently needed. The Constitution of 1904
was thought to "be the answer because it included the new
resolutions about immigration. However, the problem of
clandestine immigration and bribed government employees
continued throughout the 1940' s.
Panama had been dealing with the legal standing of immi-
gration since 1842. In that year the Isthmian Assembly im-
posed regulations having to do with black immigration. The
Conservative government of Colombia approved of slave traffic
and wanted to take advantage of Panama's geographic position
to increase the trade, but the latter f s state assembly pro-
hibited the importation and trade of "human merchandise" in
an attempt to step effectively this lugubrious economic act-
ivity. 8
Onee independent, Panama organized all of the immigra-
tion legislation in its first Constitution of 1904. Before
q1941, such legislation was clarified many times. -' The prin-
cipal documents relating to immigration are as follows:
1. Constitution of 1904: Articles 6,8,9,10,16,19,
and 21.
2. Constitution of 1941: Articles 10,12,13,14,15,17,
18,21,22,23,31,41,106,152,
andl68.
3. laws: From 1904 to date, there are sixteen laws
specifically related tc immigrants.
4. Decrees: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs made ef-
fective the policy expressed in the 12
decrees approved by the President of the
Republic
.
5. Statutes: a) Administrative Code (Codigo Adminis-
trative) : dedicated its first two
chapters exclusively to immigration.
b) Civil: Articles 1, 5a, 6, 39 40,74,
and 77 deal with the subject.
c) Commerce: Articles 8,9,10,11, and
60 regulated the commer-
cial activities of forein
ers.
d) Labor: Article 605 established
the ratio between Panama-
nian citizens and foreign
ers to be employed by a
commercial or industrial
firm in the country.
The National Constitution of 1904 was an expression of
liberal political thinking. ?rom its beginning the document
was concerned with the well being of the population as a
whole. Additionally, it guaranteed all the benefits of hu-
man freedom to the country's inhabitants. On the subject
of citizenship, the 1904 Constitution also appeared to be
open. Article 6 stated that regardless of their parent's
nationality, all those who were born on Panamanian. .soil na-
tive citizens. Naturalization was granted to those who,
after residing in the country for more than ten years, wish-
11
ed to become citizens. Although this last provision re-
quired that the applicant enjoy a certain degree of econo-
mic stability, it was not dicriminatory on the basis of race
Usually, if economic requirements were estblished, it would
follow that the disadvantaged group of people would be of
the darker race. However, given the nature of their work,
the Vest Indians enjoyed relatively good salaries in the Pa-
nama Canal Company, compared to the local wages, so that if
so desired, which was rarely the case, the West Indians
could become citizens with relative ease.
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Unfortunately, the situation changed after the com-
pletion of the canal. More than half of the West Indian
labor force joined the ranks of the unemployed in Panama.
The legislative Act ( Acto Le^islativo ) of October 19, 192S
ammended Article 6, stating that those persons who were born
in the Isthmus of foreign parents would be considered Pana-
manian citizens if after their 21st birthday
.
they opted for
1
2
said nationality. Articles 8 and 9, assured that the fo-
reigners would enjoy the same general rights of Panamanian
citizens. Article 16, protected individual rights and e-
quality before before the law for Panamanians and foreigners.
In Article 19, the Republic promised the emancipation of
those slaves who migrated to Panama. Finally, Article 21,
granted free and restricted travel withing the national te-
13
rritory to all.
Unlike that of 1904, the Constitution of 1941 is a ma-
nisfestation of the biased political attitude which was then
predominant in the Isthmus. For three years, an intransi-
gent nationalism which has been classified as "fascism" by
writers on the subject, had dominated Panama. Its most emi-
nent exponent Arnulfo Arias employed racist tactics to con-
vince Panamanians that the West Indians were responsible for
all ills of the Republic. Consequently, the Arias govern-
ment in 1941 proceeded to rid itself constitutionally of res-
ponsibility towards the Panamanians of West Indian descent.
With the promulgation of the 1941 document,
approximately
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50,000 were ipso facto
, "denationalized" ( desnacionalizados )
subjected to a long period of persistent racial discrimina-
tion the effects of which can still be felt.
The preamble of the national document states that it
was the duty of the National Assembly to promote the improve-
ment of the nation. The state guaranteed all the civil and
political rights to native Panamanians only. 1 ^ Article 10,
declared that Panama's official language was Spanish and
held the state responsible for the maintenance of its puri-
ty and promulgation throughout the country, an indirect
statement that no other language would be tolerated. Coin-
cidentally, the majority of West Indians spoke English and
verv little Spanish.
Regardless of their parent's nationality, those born
in the Republic's jurisdiction would be considered Panama-
nian citizens. They would not be so considered if one of
their parents was of prohibited immigration ( imnigracion
prohibida)
,
especially if the parent was a non-Spanish
speaking black.
1
' Article 13 made a provisional exception
to the conditions exposed in the one preoeeding it.
For
three months after the Constitution became effective,
the
President of the Republic could grant Panamanian
citizen-
ship by birth to the offspring of parents of
prohibited im-
migration who showed evidence that they lived
in, and had
been subjected to the country's jurisdiction all
their child
hood and adult years. The y also
had to be able to prove
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that Spanish was the language spoken at home. Another res-
triction was the limitation imposed upon traveling within
16the national territory.
Article 14 allowed immigrants who were not classified
as "prohibited immigrants", to become Panamanian citizens.
The following article gave power to the President to deny
17
citizenship to those applicants he considered unsuitable.
Articles 21 and 22 recognized the civil rights of the foreig-
ners, but established certain limitations. First, they re-
served political rights for native Panamanians. Second, they
stated that immigrants would be legally treated according to
their behavior. This Constitution and other Public Treaties
(Tratados Publicos ), intended to regulate immigration. The
government was to be responsible for the selection-of "Heal-
thy elements, hard workers, those who would be able to adopt
to national life and who were caprble of contributing to the
1
8
ethnic, economic and demographic improvement of the nation."
Although Article 31 specified that there would be no
death penalty and that the penalty to exile would
not be im-
posed upon Panamanians, many West Indian-Panamanians
were
forced into exile shortly after the Constitution
was promul-
gated. Three months was too short a time
for them to show
documented proof that they were born, lived
and had gone
to school in Panama. Moreover, it
was very difficult if not
impossible, to prove that Spanish was
predominantly spoken.
Obviously, this measure was not only
extremely unfair but
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represents a shameful stage in Panamanian legislation, as
well as an international disgrace.
Between the enactment of the 1904 Constitution and that
of 1941 Panamanian legislation adopted a series of legal dis-
positions which delineated the governments' policy concerning
immigration, especially in its attempt to promote the flow
of desired elements into the country. Unfortunately, the so-
cio-economic changes brought upon the Isthmus by the comple-
tion of the Canal, were decisive factors in the shift of im-
migration policy. No longer was the government's purpose to
promote desired immigration, but to check the flow of those
persons which were considered disadvantageous to the develop-
ment of the nation.
Decree Mo. 34 in 1911 encouraged the immigration of far-
mers, professionals, technicians, and retired people to Pana-
ma. In 1913, the Isthmian National Assembly approved Law 20
on January 31, with the purpose of populating vacant pieces
of lands for cultivation. Articles 25 and 26 of the first
paragraph in Chapter III, offered full ownership of plots of
lands measuring ten hectares each (24.71 acres) to those Pa-
namanian families or foreigners with permanent residence in the
country who did not already own farming land, but desired to
do so. Other legal provisions such as Lav 32 of 1919, and
Pecree 6 of 1921, continued to pursue this objective. The
offer was valid either for the plot which they already occu-
pied without legal claim or in any other part of the
country
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where land was available. The proposal held true for those
prospective immigrants, and their families, who entered the
country to dedicate themselves to rural economic activity.
Government officials, eager to secure laborers, communicated
to the Spanish and Italian governments in 1913 and 1914
through a special, semi-official, representative by the name
of Antonio Eurgos, who had conducted a study on the feasibi-
lities of such project. Immigration via these laws was clas
1°
sified as "civilized."
Promoting the maintenance of white supremacy against
the impending menace from the super-imposed immigration of
blacks, was perhaps the motive for encouraging such immigra-
tion. The Spanish government was enthusiastic in its res-
20
pnse to the initiative "so promising" to Panama. The
Panamanian government thought that the offer would attract
many prospective farmers from those countries which would
be more adaptable to Panamanian culture. Nevertheless, few
came because the building of the canal still gave more imme-
diate financial compensation.
The construction of the canal was completed in 1914.
The large labor force which had been employed for the task
was no longer needed. The mass of unemployed made them-
selves felt in the Panamanian economy, either by their lack
of funds, or by challenging the normal labor force
of the
country. M 0 st European migrants engaged
in the trades, es-
tablished themselves as small merchants,
shopkeepers or
restaurant owners. They blended into the national group
quickly due to their common Latin heritage. The West Indians
on the unemployed. About 1795 went to work for the United Fruit
Company in the banana plantations throughout Central America.
A smaller percentage continued to be employed as the mainte-
nance staff of the Panama Canal Company. The rest remained
jobless. Although they considered their stay as transitory,
few took advantage of the repatriation which the Canal Company
guaranteed. While many still hoped to find jobs in the Canal
Zone, they had to turn to Panama in search of employment.
The country did not have sufficient job openings for
the natives, much less for the West Indians. As
they conti-
nued to be out of permanent employment, the
living conditions
of the West Indians deteriorated. These
consumers were no
longer as profitable as they had been to the
Panamanian land-
lords and commerce in general. The
government started to re-
gard then an unpleasant burden. As
a result, the National
Assembly added the West Indians to the
list of unwanted immi-
ration. Law 13 of November 23, 1926
was passed to implement
government measures on immigration.
Article 1 forbade
the immigration of Chinese,
Japanese, Syrians, Turks, Indo-
Asians (indico-orientales),
Indo-Arians (Indo-arios) , Dravi-
diane and West Indians as well
as Guyanese Blacks, whose or,-
+ o^ifih 21 Those already established
girpl language was not Spanis .
v • v,ofl + r -ravel temporarily out of the
count-
as residents who wished ,o
^ci ^- ^
nr^pce they were married to a Pana-
rv were denied re-entry,
unless n }
g
new
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manian or who har\d their business recorded in the Civil
Registry.
Also in 1926, immigration quotag ^ ^ttt*. The
g °Vernment :iUStified
«*« -asure as an economic necessity
and assigned the following numbers:
Group A: Holland, Switzerland
Norway and Sweden 200 perBOns/yr
Group B: Australia, Denmark, New Zealand,
Plnland 100
Group C: Germany, Austria and Philippines 50
Group D: Haiti and other countries not
specified in the previous groups,
nor those of prohibited immigra-iion
. 10
anama
The quotas excepted foreign immigrants working in the P
Canal. They were subjected to the regulations contained in
the various Public Treaties ( Tratados Fublicos ). Law 16 of
January 31, 1 9 27 ammended Law 13. The racial discrimination
in this document is evident when it stated that those belong
ing to the races referred to in the first article of Law 13
of 1926, would not be admitted as immigrants even if they
had been born in, or were citizens of another country. Up
to 1923, the annual immigration quotas were set according
to the perrons' country of origin. Fro^ that year on, imrai-
gration quotas were based on race/-' Lav; 16 also granted
the executive power authorize ticn to allow West Indian immi-
grants into the country provided that the applicant, in this
case the United States, could prove that:
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a) There was a shortage of specialized workers in the
country that were required for specific projectsin the Canal. 0
b) The project or work required was for the publicbenefit or was of an agricultural nature.
c) The immigrant worker's salsries
pwould not be lowerthan the national minimum wage. •
This change in legal dispositions reflected the influential
role played by the United States and the Canal Zone Govern-
ment in the country's decisions.
In 1938, Law 54 reaffirmed in its fifteenth article the
discriminatory policies enacted through twenty-four years of
immigration legislation. It stated:
"The immigration of Chinese, gypsies, North Africans,
Turks, and non-Spanish speaking blacks, is absolutely
prohibited. Those foreigners belonging to any of these
races, who come as substitutes of a fellow countryman,
will be considered as transients only, and will not be
able to reside in the national territory"
In order to guarantee the enforcement of these measures, the
National Assembly established the Central immigration Office
Through Law 79 on July 25, 1941, Chapter II, Title VII. Clas-
sified as a "Preventive Police Service" (Servicio de Policia
Preventive) , this office verified the legal entrance, the place
of residence, and departure of all immigrants and residents.
According to Nicolas Delgado, the immigration officers used
these restrictive measures for graft.
25 Other decrees res-
tricted "prohibited" immigrants once they were in the country
limiting further their participation in Panamanian life.
Work laws were enacted as early as 1914, to
curtail their
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their economic activities. For example, Law 6 of October 29,
1914 protected native Panamanian workers against the im-
pending threat of West Indians after the completion of the
canal. According to this law, employers were to choose na-
tive workers over the foreigners under equal circumstances.
The United States would have to hire at least 50°i of its
permanent labor force from those unemployed native citizens
while the project lasted. Another, law 6, passed on Octo-
ber 13, 1926, required that Panamanian or foreign owners of
all business, commercial, agricultural, and industrial esta-
blishments functioning within the national territory to have
at least 75% of their laborers Panamanian. 26 In 1930, the
National Assembly approved Law 17 of December 19, prohibitin
immigration of workers engaged in trades that would be com-
petitive to those of Panamanians. Although this particular
measure was justified by the onslaught of the great depres-
sion, it was obvious that the Panamanian government had
failed to create sufficient jobs for its workers. Notwith-
standing, the government claimed to protect the national in-
terests. Government officials contended that Panamanian le-
gislation rejected West Indians' immigrants based on eco-
nomic factors alcne. Notwithstanding, social rejection of
this group was being nurtured on the side also. The Panama-
nian government implemented further labor restrictions on
immigration in 1931, by prohibiting the entrance of artisans
to the country.
25 Law 16 of November 16, 1931 modified Law
29
71, in order to clarify the restricted group. As they
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would no longer be able to come to Panama as manual workers,
the West Indians had claimed to be artisans in their appli-
cations as an alternative for entry.
Finally in 1941, the Decree-Law 28 of July 28, provided
native workers with absolute protection. Those persons of
prohibited immigration were banned from all kinds of jobs
except those of a menial nature. They might dedicate them-
selves to agriculture, aviculture, apiculture, hand laundering
and domestic occupations or they could be chauffeurs, mecha-
30mcs, or artisans. Aside from all these belittling prac-
tices against West Indians they were forbidden to express
their religious, philosophic, political or scientific ideas
through public means of communication such as the press.
Moreover, they could not openly formulate opinions about the
31
country's national politics.
After the adoption of the 1941 Constitution, the West
Indian migrant felt more acutely the steady pressure of na-
tionalism working to restrict and finally to reduce him to
a negligible factor in the socio-economic structure of the
country.'
2 All these measures forced the total separation
of this social group from the Panamanian national constitu-
ency. Instead of finding ways to plan programs that would
promote their integration to the nation's way of life, the
persistently discriminatory immigration policies contributed
to the West Indian's rejection of their host country's cul-
ture .
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One of the principal reasons underlining the appeal of
Panama as a haven in 1904, was its alleged political freedom
characterized by the total absence of discrimination against
the foreigners. Differences of race did not matter. What
interested the country was the betterment of the ethnic for-
mation of its inhabitants and to look for a greater homogen-
eity of the society. This idealistic position had received
many set backs by 1941, by the creation of standard rules in
order to select the immigrants according to race. The adop-
tion of the anti-democratic position of prohibiting immigra-
tion, particularly the one composed of black people who did
not speak Spanish was one of these policies. The review of
the Constitutions of 1904 and 1941 shows that the basic con-
tradictions between both and the use of many other legal tool
are proof of patent discrimination against a large group of
people who contributed to the welfare of the country.
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CHAPTER IV
OFFICIAL REJECTION OF VEST INDIAN
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A few weeks after proclaiming its independence from
Spain on November 28, 1821, Panama's new leaders decided to
united their country's destinies to those of Colombia. A
significant number of 'Panamanians' regretted having approv-
ed of the annexation. Many felt that as Panama had volunta-
rily joined the State of Colombia, she should be granted a
generous degree of autonomy. In. fact, that nation's econo-
mic and political evolution was incongruous to the latter'
s
archaic and centralist political structure. Colombia's
treatment of the Isthmian province was cause for growing
discontent among Panamanians. According to G-. A. Mellander,
such uneasiness nurtured a "spirit of revolution and separa-
tion" which "manifested itself with recurring regularity
throughout the years of Colombian hegemony over Panama."
This chapter will deal with the rise of Panamanian national-
ism under Colombian rule and the socio-economic factors which
buttressed it curing the first four decades of the present
century
.
The representatives of the democratic movements in Pana-
ma, adopted the liberal doctrines. Simon Bolivar's military
victories in South America gave an important thrust to sepa-
ratist ideals. in November 28, 1821, independence
was pro-
claimed in Villa de los Santos, receiving general
acceptance
as soon as it was made known. Eon Jose Pabrega was
appointed
first governor of the new country. However,
he had to accept
almost unanimous decision recognizing Panama as
part of
an
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Gran Colombia (Estado Republicano de Colombia). 1 Above all,
Fabrega tried to avoid violence coming from those who object-
ed to Panama's annexation to Colombia and recognized the eco-
nomic advantage of the country's location between two contin-
ents and oceans. Upon joining Gran Colombia, one of the first
demands made in Panama was that popular elections be held for
Assembly representatives.
The decision to become part of Colombia resulted from the
need for defense against potential reprisals from Spain, but
union with Colombia brought few benefits. The language of
their former colonizer was almost the only link that united
both countries. • When Colombia showed through parish divisions,
the difficulty it had in keeping the Gran Colombian union, Pa-
nama felt confident enough to propose a reunification of Gran
Colombia through its administration which had separated on
September 26, 1S30 from Colombia. The military commander of
the Isthmus, General Jose P. Espinar, offered the government
of Panama to Bolivar.
2
At Bolivar's request, Panama rejoined
Gran Colombia three months later.
General Eligio Alzuru began another separatist movement
July 9, 1831, creating a dictatorship that lasted 50 days
until it was crushed by General Tonas Herrera's troops.
Herrera was appointed General Commander of the Isthmian
Ee-
partment in July of 1831 during Alzuru's assumption of
power.
After General Alzuru's total deposition,
General Herrera be-
came provisional governor of Panama. In 1832,
Gran Colombia
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became Nueva Granada with the drafting n-r ^u ixm of a new constitution
and Juan Jose Argote was appointed Governor of Panama. Thus,
the division of powers, long sought in Panama, was establish-
ed when Argota was in charge of civil matters and General
Ferrer of the military. Their administration was a progres-
sive one which showed the administrative capacity of the lo-
cal government, A factor which was important in their gov-
ernment program, was the creation of a free port in Porto-
belo as a means to combat smuggling and create more facil-
•x
ities for commercial activities.
A Panamanian, General Herrera's nomination as military
commander of the Isthmus, strengthened the desire for inde-
pendence through the years. The political instability of the
Colombian administration caused an impact in Panama, and the
economic depression reduced the region to real misery. Both
factors strongly contributed to the thought that the best
solution for Panama could be found in independence. On Nov-
ember IS, 1840, the Isthmian Assembly declared its separa-
tion from a central government which the majority of Nueva
Granada's provinces opposed. Panama left the door opened
to the possibility of becoming a state once more, if a fed-
eral government was implanted in Colombia. Nevertheless,
Panama bagan its new independence under the name of Free
. 4
State of the Isthmus (l stado Libre del Isthmus). The in-
dependence experience made evident the Isthmus capacity for
maintaining an autonomous government. Luring this time, an
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army and police force were constituted. An economic struc-
ture was developed, based on a triburary system allowing
investments on education; such as, the creation of a Uni-
versity, as well as the establishment of economic and di-
plomatic relations with Costa Rica.
Unfortunately, the life of the new country was of short
duration, ending on November 28, 1841. Although General
Herrera refused to rejoin Nueva Granada, Panama's legisla-
tive body was "persuaded" to accept Colombia's proposal.
Nevertheless, the experience had clearly revealed the deep
nationalistic convictions of the Panamanian people and their
persistent efforts to find the. recognition of their rights.
A vague promise of some autonomy helped Colombia reaffirm
its power in the Isthmus.
Due to its implicit weakness, and in order to secure
Panama for its own, Colombia supported the Monroe Doctrine
to avoid any foreign intervention in the Isthmus. As a re-
sult, in 1846 Nueva Granada signed an agreement called the
Kallarino-Pidlack Treaty with the United Ctates. In ex-
changefor the right to establish a passageway through Pan-
anr convenient to its expansionist projects, the United
States government guaranteed Colombian sovereignty in said
5term ory
.
In 1849, the liberal Party succeed eo in replacing the
Conservatives in the Colombian government. The 1853 cons-
titution was the liberals' attempt to create a federal state
°3
within a unitary Republic. 6 In Pebruary 27>^ ^ ^
constitution established a specific regulation regarding Pa-
nama, through which it was granted local autonomy. The army
and navy, foreign affairs, income and credits corresponding
to the federal state, remained under the Colombian govern-
ment which might intervene in the interoceanic communica-
tion whose benefits were designed to pay its foreign debt.
From 1851-1855, Panama enjoyed her first period of peace
and prosperity under General Herrera's third tern as govern-
or. The circumstances created by the construction of the
railroad, brought the first stage of modernization to the
country. Money was abundant and circulated in gold. The
economic activities shifted from rural to merchantile. The
bonanza helped to rebuild the main cities, to open' schools
and hospitals, to update plazas and to open new markets. U-
tilizing its autonomy, the government proved efficient in its
administration of public funds. It was obvious to the nu-
merous foreigners who worked or traded in Panama, that this
country had a personality of its own.
The pride of being necessary to the world at large ant?
the assurance of tapping an inexhaustible treasure, v/ere
two attitudes that underlined the character of Panamanians.
From now on, this popular feeling constantly developed into
a strong nationalism in spite of adverse situations. Three
basic objectives defined this nationalism: to preserve the
cultural heritage through the use of Spanish as the official
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language and as a tool for education; to protect the rights
of the "Spanish" social class through the imposition of
strict regulations for immigrants of different races, and
to administer exclusively the country's wealth.
During the 1860's, two major changes occurred in Pana-
ma. One was the separation of church and state in 1862.
"Don Manuel Maria Diaz' provisional government seized church
wealth and properties. It banned the various religious com-
munities, such as convents and abbeys and expelled nuns from
7
Panama, September 9, 1862. Another change followed the
drafting of a new constitution, May 8, 1863. The United
States of Colombia became the name of the new federal gov-
ernment which was composed by Antioquia, Bolivar, Boyaca,
Cauca, Cundinamarca, Magdalena, Panama, Santander, and To-
lima. Panama was constituted as a sovereign state whose
governors would now be presidents. From 1864-1871, there
were fratricidal encounters within the military sector about
whether the state militi? or the National Guard, had more
predominance, causing an alarming lack of public security
as Panamanian historian Ruben D. Carles has written: "it
Q
was a labyrinth of person?! preferences and interests."
There was controversy in Panama, as well as in Colom-
bia, concerning the former's real status. Some thought
Pa-
nama should be considered a sovereign state With
complete
powers. Others, could only envision the Isthmus
as part of
Colombia. The situation climaxed in 1893 with
the beginning
of the War of a Thousand Days. Although this war was a ma-
jor conflict within Colombia, some Panamanian leaders made
independence their objective during this civil aggression.
The international acknowledgement of Panama as a strategic
point for the future, was particularly appealing to the Uni-
ted States government. It would try to be first in having
the privilege of control over the Isthmus. The government
of Panama was aware of every strategy designed to arrive at
that goal. Economically, the situation had changed, the
bankruptcy provoked by the French enterprise on the canal,
had affected everyone. Dissatisfaction toward the Colombian
government was the result. On the other hand, since the Col-
ombian senate disapproved the Eerran-Hay Treaty, relations
with the United States became highly strained, lack of unity
for a positive independence left the country in the hands of
many leaders who preferred the destruction of a civil war
that lasted three years to the benefit of a common entente.
When independence was reached on November 3, 1903 , the new
nation was almost taken by surprise. The new treaty for
the construction of the canal between independent Panama and
the United States, was not known to most Panamanians until
much later. It seeme* as if everyone was framed in order
to recognize the necessity of an independent country, while
at the same time, to curtail the development of its nation-
ality. Such disposition forewarned a strange and dangerous
alliance between the U.S. and certain Panamanian officials.
Panama, as an independent country, could not assure real
stability in its future and act according to the location of
its territory and its "immense wealth". The United States'
presence would be cause for constant frictions, misunder-
standing and finally, of a national movement against its
role. The administration privileges of the Canal, and the
right to intervention in Panama's political life, as granted
in Article VII of the 1 903 Treaty, could only end in a nation-
al liberation movement. 9 The rights granted in the 1903 treaty
were ratified in the 1904 Constitution. Already in the late
1910's, the nation's 'progressive' sectors stated their oppo-
sition to the various United States military interventions,
as well as to the different administrations which had been
collaborating and benefited from such measures. At that time,
the use of force, silenced this opposition, but it helped to
strengthen the group of professionals and young people who
wished to put an end to the 1903 Canal Treaty.
In the late 1930*3, would-be president Dr. Arnulfo Arias
Madrid, emerged as the spokesman for national feelings. His
government represented the national bourgeoisie as well as
the popular sectors of the cities and countryside. 10 Arias
changed the National emblem from 'Pro mundi beneficio' to
"honor, justice and freedom". The reformist program rejected
North American influence by including a general revision of
the 1904 constitution which was a clear expression of the
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will that Panama belonged to Panamanians alone. The theme
of "Panama for Panamanians", would lead to the reorganiza-
tion of the nation as whole, and to the establishment of ri-
gid norms for its socio-nnli+i^^C1 ° Poetical structure. Black immi-
grants who did not speak Spanish were one of the victims of
the revision. The revisionist measures sought to reaffirm a
/
national identity through a restructuring of the socio-eco-
nomic system, in order to counteract the dependent mentality
which had developed, due to the all-encompassing nature of the
United States preset, in the Isthmus. 11 Panama's economic
development was difficult and disproportionate.
Fluctuations of the interoceanic transit, inherently
affected the country's production activities. The tempora-
ry or transient population at times was superior in number
to the permanent one. Because of the country's particular
economic activities, the population density differed from
one place to another disproportionately. Additionally, the
rural migration to the urban sectors maintained the local
markets severely limited in scope, making it difficult for
the creation of basic industries. These markets were also
12highly dependent upon outside stimuli. Aside from disad-
vantageous competition with the United States, the lack of
accessibility to business probability estimates for Panama-
nian industrialists, private enterprises, and commerce in
general, deterred long range investments and the exploita-
tion of national resources through industrial development.
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Instead, most capital remained static, engaged only in short-
range investments and preferably those which would render dis-
proportionally high interests to the amount invested. 13
The working-class was most affected by these circumstances
because permanent employment was not guaranteed. They could
find only seasonal jobs which involved, in most cases, humi-
liating working conditions. As a result, the unemployed sought
to work in the two sectors which could guarantee them a permanent
and constant li velihood—the Panamanian government and the
North American administration of the Panama Canal Zone and
Company. 4 Neither proved beneficial nor served as promoters
of an adequate and necessary national identity. Government
employees received pay for their political loyalty rather
than their administrative output— a policy which led" to the
deterioration of the merit system and the prevalence of influ-
ential, but highly incompetent personnel. The bureacracy un-
derestimated the worker's production and degraded his social
function. On the other hand, the Panama Canal Company instill'
ed feelings of apathy, rejection and alienation among Panama-
nian laborers towards their country.
^
a
During the 1920' s, the general attitude of Panamanians
was pessimism, distrust, and apprehension for their future.
Very few believed that Panama could function* ae an independent
and self reliant political entity. V/ithin this context, one
can not only justify Arnulfo Aria's emergence as a reactionary
nationalist, but also state that his political presence cor-
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responded to the times and to the historical necessity of
the country in that 'stage of development'. In order to
reaffirm the concept of nationality in Panamanians, it would
be necessary to erradicate their anti-national mentality, by
emphasizing the possibility of being absorbed by a foreign
culture, namely the United States, 15 which could very well
have "used" Vest Indians an instruments for their 'cultural
penetration '
.
The awakening of Panamanian consciousness was manifested
in the various integration efforts during the 1930' s, in the
hopes of achieving national consolidation. Politically pro-
gressive sectors, especially the student movements, began
to question the country's conventional axioms. They advo-
cated a process of national 'regeneration', increasingly
based on nationalistic principle. In 1935, the National TJ-
niversity was founded and new political parties emerged to
search for a true definition of the Panamanian 'essence'.
Intellectuals wrote on the nature of Panamanian culture, or
Panamenidad as it has been called. Octovio Mendez Pereira
stated that Panama's 'spiritual life' was intimately related
to the country's transitory nature, which curtailed the de-
velopment of strong traditions and a better understanding
of its nationality.
1
Diogenes de la Rosa proposed that the
given economic infrastructure of the country coupled with
nan as a 'social being', determined the character of Panama-
nians. He went on to say that their carefree attitude, their
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preference for improvisation and lack of projection were the
results of "acquired wealth without effort", causing a spi-
ritual and cultural superficiality. 17 Diego Pominguez Caba-
llero stressed that the society's lack of homogeneity, the
sharp contrast between the desolate introverted rural ambi-
ence and the complex, extrovert urban setting, created three
different worlds—the campesino
. capitalize , and criollo— es-
pecially in the cities. He contended that Panamanians were
impulsive and emotive, lacking enough consciousness and ef-
1
8
fort to fight for what they wanted.
The change in political trend, as well as people's
attitudes was reflected in 1934 when Panama refused a United
States check for ^250,000 as payment for the Canal Zone ter-
ritory. It demanded that the payment be made in gold, as
the paper currency had been devaluated. Another example
occurs in 1936 with the signing of the Arias-Roosevelt Treaty,
also called the General Treaty of Friendship and Collabora-
tion ( Tratado General de Amjgtart y Cooperacion
)
.
This was the
first treaty that was partially beneficial to Panama. It
"did awfcj with" United States' intervention. The United
States would, no longer 'defend* Panama's sovereignty or ac-
quire any additional lands for the 'canal's maintenance'. 19
That same ye?r, the rent of the canal was increased from
$250,000 per year, to $450,000.
Panama's reputation of a melting pot has been referred
to more adequately, as a "mosaic milieu. In spite of
living in close proximity, racial groups did not intermingle
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in significant percentages to affect each other's character-
istics deeply. Lacking in orientation, leadership and a
strong sense of national unity, Panama's nationalists in-
creasingly began to focus on the West Indian group, They
considered this group an obstacle to the reaffirmation of
their nationality. "No hard and fast lines, barred one
from participation in any field on the basis of race", but
it is true that the restrictions were experienced in an eco-
on
nomic level. The greatest restrictions against West Indians
occurred curing periods of depression and acute tinemployment*
Then national resentment was at its highest
f
as West Indians
were preferred for Canal Zone employment , because they would
work for less money and were assigned local rates. Panama-
nian nationalists also saw their culture endangered as Pro-
testanitism, with its unnumerable sects and practices, be-
2 2
came more influential.
As nationalism grew, the country's racial composition
was described by the government as an overwhelming mixture
of Spanish and Indian, placing other racial groups, such as
blacks, mestizos and mulattoes as secondary. Table VIII pro-
vides the racial distribution of the total population in 1941.
It shows mulattoes as the largest group, totaling 354,079.
Although Panamanians did not enjoy being considered a black
nation, they were proud to tell of the "historically rebe-
llious nature of the native negroes". Compared to them, the
west Indians were servile and slavish. Therefore, Panamanians
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could not feel any racial solidarity with a group that was
as "impotent" as they were. The Biesanzs make an interesting
point in saying that:
"Panamanian resentment of the Chombo* has been tied
up with their fear of the yanquis."^
Chombo is a local terra used to describe the West Indians.
During the 1930 ' s-40 ' s , 'Chombo' was derogatory term, but it
has lost a lot of its original meaning.
In 1939, when Panamanian nationalis, was very strong and
Arnulfo Arias had been isisting for some time that the nation
ethnic composition could not afford to absorb any more blacks
the United States exerted pressure on the national legislatur
to allow a fourth wave of West Indian immigration for the con
struction of the third set of locks. So that against its
will and contrary to the government measures, Panama was co-
erced into allowing more West Indians to come. Nevertheless,
government officials demanded that a clause in the contract
stipulate that they were definitely forbidden to enter the
national territory. Although popular opinion was against
We st Indian presence, there were others who were sympathetic
to this group, giving it serious thought to their situation.
An editorial of the Panama Tribune in 1939, dealt
with
this matter extensively:
We believe it is time that the governments of the
vari-
ous West Indian Islands and the British government
which is responsible for the welfare of those
island,
begin to find avenues for the enplcyrent of the
brawn
and sinew and intelligence of the population of
the is-
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if
1
^' t
f n
?
t in their own ^land home, certainly with-
in br2 ad expanse of an empire which has Mnltni+pfl
,
a untold resources. PThe West l2dian*go^£ents
the lU it n^P ^V- fiara -??. di6ni 5y ' contin^ to maintain
ly for the sake of being provided with the dtil? br?ad
of life which they have difficulty in obtaining in theirown homes. " °
If West Indian workers are to be brought again to work
on the Panama Canal, it should be on the basis of better
wages and better conditions or even the prevailing stan-
dard which, God knows is bad enough, although better thanlorneriy. There should be no lowering of the scale, no
retrogression to former times. In all the picre^ive
countries of the world, a proper value is being placed
upon the labor of man. The West Indian should not con-
tinue^ to be the only exception to this rule. It is on
this basis that we rest our entire objection. If it is
to be utilized, there must be a New Deal for Wes 4: Indian
labor. 2 4
The work lasted five years. West Indians did not get
a better deal, approximately 23% of the 25,000 workers brought
in from Jamaica, returned home although their contracts clear-
ly forbade them to come into Panama, West Indians were compel-
led to do so, as unemployed immigrants were not able to re-
main in the Canal Zone territory. One of the reasons was Ca-
nal Zone government's inability and unwillingness to the alien
25
population in the Canal Zone was estimated at 30,043.
The situation in Panama City was worse. The capital was
not large enough to offer an ample market for the profession-
ally trained, much less for the unskilled laborers. The pop-
ulation Census for 1921 counted 40,000 inhabitants in Panama
City. Nine years later, in 1930, the population had increased
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TABLE VIII
POPULATION CENSUS, RACIAL DISTRIBUTION
1940
Indians 64,960
Mestizos 137,604-
Negroes 82,871
Mulattoes 271,208
Total 631,549
Source: Panama. Oficina del Censo. Distribucion
de la poblacion por raza, 1940.
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up to 74,409. Approximately 25% of the city's total popu-
lation was foreign born and predominantly black. 26 In 1940,
Panama City counted with 111,893 inhabitants, approximately
26.396, or 29,402, were black. (Gee table No. IX).
As the labor market was very limited, Panamanian de-
pendence on government jobs was high. In addition, there
was a shift of control in the fields of activities from
one ethnic group to another. The merchant activities, for-
merly in the hands of the national upper-class fell uner
the domination of Chinese, Hindus and Europeans. The West
Indian labor force constituted a serious threat to the na-
tive workers in the menial or unskilled occupations—in
the factories, as maids, chauffers, masons and in. construc-
tion work. In order to protect citizens, national legisla-
tion stipulated that some professions required that prac-
titioners be Panamanian-born. Real estate and government
employment were also fields exclusive for Panamanians
.
2 7
Once they retired from the Panama Canal Company, West
Indians lost the right to live in the Zone's budget housing,
to buy in the post exchanges, or to secure Zonian medicines
or medical assistance. Cince few returned to their islands
of origin, they had no choice but to go to Panama's termi-
nal cities where they had friends and family ties. From
the 1940's to the 1960's, their retirement pay was
025. CO
per month. The retirees further aggravated
Panama's al-
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TABLE IX
PERCENTAGE OF BLACK IN TOTAL POPULATION
TOTAL POP. BLACK POP. PERCENTAGE
Province of Panama 171,939 33,770 22.5
Panama City 111,393 29,402 26.3
Province of Colon 57,297 28,703 50.0
Colon 44,393 23.532 53.0
Provine e of Bocas 9,949 5,357 59.0
Source: George V/esterman, The Problem of West Indian Off-
springs in Panama: > ^lu'..' u. : of gggg Heia;io:iL:iiips
"Fetveen Ethnic and Cultural Groups in a Cosnio?o-
litan Setting. (Panama: 1944) p. 157
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ready serious housing, hosmt.i Q aS, pital and rest home conditions.
After having given their best vearc +vy s„ those who had worked
anywhere from 25 to ,o years for the ?anama Canal
—
bare necessities. Approximate!, 75„ of ^^ betwegn
-0
- ,,
years old. 0f these, nearly 8* needed to he con-
fined to hospital heds or to puhlic ho.es for the elderly, a
situation which would cost the state almost S481.800.00 a
year. The Canal Zone Government would pay only 2 5% 0 f the
total expense, making Panaraa responsihle for the rest
% 361, 350. 00 It was an unfair demand on Panama, as only
an insignificant percentage of those retiree! from the Zone,
had ever paid national taxes.
All of the above-mentioned factors contributed to settin
the stare for Arnulfo Arias' interpretation of Panamanian
nationalism. Ke embodied his analysis of the state of natio-
al affairs in the pronouncement, of the Panamegfsta* program.
At best, this 'program' attempted to instill national pride,
dignity and self-respect for their culture in Panamanians.
At worse Panarce?.isno was political sensationalism based on ra
cir-1 discrimination.^
Arnulfo Arias began to assert himself in national poli-
tics during the depression. He rejected any foreign ideolo-
gies or influences even though his definition of Pa^iaroeglemo
as an innovation was vague. In fact, Panamei:ismo was another
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way to define nationalism with a pre-eminent regionalistic
nature. He thought it was necessary to create more jobs,
paying higher salaries so that the working class would be-
nefit. He called for close national unity, discipline and
order, as well as for the unification of the national ideol-
ogies and hopes to "assure" the country's future. As a. na-
tionalist, Arnulfo Arias call for a strong and independent
government, which would not le representative of the upper
class' economic interests, obstacles so long to the socio-
political development of the country. He refused to admit
that Panama's geographic position alone would determine its
government policies, much less distort its Indian-Spanish
( Indo-espafiola ) , 'personality'.^ 0
According to Arias, Panama's racial composition was ex-
clusively the result of an Indian and Spanish mixture. He
argued that people of other cultures were unassimilable and
should not be part of the national society. He critized
actively the Chinese, Hindus and black West Indians alleging
thst they were undesirable because they did not speak Spa-
nish. Many natives felt that West Indians brought dislike
upon themselves because they lacked 'personal care', were
31
misbehaved! socially and were 'ordinarily loud'.
Arias thought, Panama had a promising future if it
could overcome the "racial problem". He was convinced that
this serious issue had its roots in the Canal construction
era, when the North American government introduced large
I
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numbers of people "of strange color into our culture". 52
Arias did not deny that some West Indians, once assi-
milated into the national culture, had contributed to it.
However, he was extremely critical of those, he considered
them the majority, who continued to live as strangers group-
ed together in Panama City and Colon, protected from expul-
sion because they were Panamanian-born and safeguarded through
their parents' British citizenship. 55 Arias also criticized
the United States immigration, measures and its insistence in
hiring West Indians only to work on the canal, aggravating
the social tension in Panama. Economically, neither the
Asian or black-West Indian immigrants were helpful for Pana-
ma, as there was a preponderance of unskilled labor that
could not be absorbed by an underdeveloped country. •• Once
asked about immigration, Arias said:
The kind of immigration we want for our country, must
meet certain physical and moral requirements. These
immigrants must be willing to work and share with our
noble and hospitable native, our nation.1 s wealth. Wel-
come are all artisans who come to teach their trade in
our shops and encourage the creation of industries.
Most of all, welcomed are the farmers who will come to
moke our lands fertile. ^4
The Panameiilsta program ( el credo panameflista ) espoused
regulator immigration. It stated that the numbers of immi-
grants should be allowed according to the country's capacity
-to incorporate then. The immigrant had to obey the laws, res-
pect the country's traditions, and learn "pananeilismo." , but
he could not deliberately compete with Panamanians in the
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professions. Immigrants who came with intentions of exploiting
natives would be refused and/or repatriated. Also to he re-
fused were those who tried to promote • anti-democratic ' ideas,
as well as those who could possibly create a 'minority problem'.
The objective of Arias' policy was to incorporate all
sectors of the population within the; national economy and to
introduce different groups of immigrants into the country gra-
dually, taking into consideration Panama's ability to make
room for them it is society. Felipe Escobar justifies Arias'
policy on the ground that his racism was no different than that
of past administrations and at least he tried to set up a
screening process whereby the immigrants entering the country
36
could be prospective Panamanians.
The Panamenistt "doctrine" climaxed with the ratifica-
tion of the 1941 Constitution. It was a manifestation of the
Aries Administration's political ideology, as well as a re-
flection of the popular sentiment at the time. Felipe Esco-
bar describes the Panamehista doctrine as being similar in
concept to Mussolini's fascist party in Italy, and Hitler's
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Nazi party in Germany. Maloney and Priestly designate
Arnulfo Arias' political ideology as a manifestation of Pana-
manian society's total rejection of West Indians. They con-
tend that it was an outgrowth of foreign capital's associa-
tion with the national oligarchy which imposed a normative
cultural pattern beneficial to their interests. Ideologically,
the Panamenists doctrine curtailed minority participation in
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in the political process. Consequently, total national con-
sciousness could not be achieved if group divisions persis-
ted. v.F. Goytia affirms that the ratification of the 1941
Constitution was the beginning of a degeneration of human and
political principles which very well could have led the count-
39
ry into anarchy.
The lack of an effective cultural interaction between
Panamanians and West Indians was due to the insufficiency of
adequate educational facilities, the absence of industries,
8 scanty government interest and the affected group's indif-
ferent and unsympathetic attitude toward their 'adopted'
counrjy. These factors contributed to the immigrants' re-
fusal to take part in the national struggle of revindica-
tion.
Panama did not establish a minimum or preliminary edu-
cation program to explain its social norms to the newcomers.
Moreover, the restrictive measures for admission to the pu-
blic school system, kept many West Indian children isolated
from the Panamanian youth. The government did not organize
any community program, to make the process of integration
smoother. Neither the media--newspaper and radio—nor the
civic or religious groups m^de arrangements to arouse favor-
able public opinion about these immigrants
.
There was friction between the two groups as they com-
peted for the few jobs available due to an almost non-exist-
entindustrialization process. The government did institute
i noX \»/ C
well-defined economic practices which would foment the agri-
cultural and industrial development in rural areas. In the
cities, employment went to those who had influence, ( padri-
nos)
•
In private business, the employee was insufficiently
compensated. We see then that there were very few incent-
ives for immigrants.
.
The problem got worse because none of the governments
responsible for the immigrants—Great Britain, United States
or Panama—ever considered the West Indian worker's adapata-
tion to a different socio-cultural milieu. Proof of the
apparent lack of concern for theri 'human merchandize* was
that the British and North Americans only considered their
work resiliency, not the cultural discrepancy between them
and the native group. However, it would be unethical to
blame these governments alone. As we have seen in previous
chapters, West Indians made things worse because they con-
sidered their stay in Panama, as transitory, not bothering
to interact or learn a little about where they were living.
Their main, almost exclusive, interest was to acquire some
wealth so they could return to their countries with a
better
po sition
.
The North Americans did not care whether or not
West
Indians were adapting to their new environment.
Their only
concern was that they do the work that was
demanded of them.
Their bigoted attitude towards the ncn-white
races did not
permit them to allow black participation
in the Canal Zone's
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"socio-economic democracy". On the other hand, Panama at-
tempted to free itself of the responsibility
,
instituting
and forcing the restrictive legal measures which completely
disassociated the West Indian group from the natives. More-
over, it established a process of denationalization of West
Indian-Panamanians. Once the 1941 Constitution was approved,
approximately 50,000 of them had their citizenship revoked.
These measures were not the best that either government
could have adopted because different ethnic groups which
composed the Isthmian community could not be separated from
one another without undermining the country's nationality.
Greater work opportunities in the Canal Zone continued
to attract V.'est Indians and their offsprings. Due- to the
international nature of the Canal, it was an advantage for
the Panama Canal Company to have a bilingual labor force.
Paradoxically, the Canal Zone government ignored or rejected
their requests for housing in its territory. In turn, the
great majority lived in the Zone's outskirts, which were
Panama's slum areas— Calidonia, San Miguel and Chorrillo.
Panama only offered them economic conditions similar to
those of the islands. Politically, the Vest Indians could
not or as an excape from their living situation, as well as
to amass a large quantity of money for their return to the
islands. As a result, close ties were established between
the Canal Company and then. Both groups, West Indians
and
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North Americans, shared a common "background—their British-
based culture, language and similar living styles. This
commonality propitated a gradual but constant process of
V.'est Indian assimilation of and adaption to North American
principles, way of life, and their feelings of superiority
tp Panamanians.
There was superficial West Indian assimilation of the
Panamanian cultural patterns. Regardless of their deficien-
cy, ITorth Americans offered them at least a second-rate edu-
cation, in comparison to Panama banning their children from
its public schools. West Indians felt a sense of gratitude
towards North Americans, in spite of the racial
discrimina-
tion they experienced in the Zone. After all, it
was not
much different from their way of life in the British
West
Indies. Nevertheless, this ethnic group considered
itself
the product of a socially hybrid environment.
Although West Indians did not enjoy social,
political
or economic stability in Panama.,
their large numbers and the
of residence there, allowed then
to become more
long yea-
Pb^orbec into the local 'population.
Consequently, they con-
sidered themselves an integral part
of the national culture,
as they had contributed to the
country's economic transfer-
, .. „ 0 . + tr „c » 3 -, e cislly those stipulated
nation. The legal dispositions,
esp a j
in the -41 Constitution came as a big
U«» to thee. Having
lo8t ,11 ties Kith their
countries of origin. Vest Indians
di , not *no« any other way
of life hut the Panamanian.
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Like their predecessors in the British Islands, West
Indians now faced a similar socio-economic situation, but
a worse political circumstance. They had two alternatives-
emigration or endurance of the racial persecution. The old-
er members of the West Indian community were inclined to
overlook the problem, its importance and implications. A
popular choice was to attempt to secure United States' citi-
zenship. A less attractive prospect was to become British
citizens. For those who wished to remain in Panama, the
only prerogative for West Indians was to fight to have their
inherent citizen rights restored. In 1944, they founded the
National Civic League ( Li*:a Civica Nacional ) to represent
them legally. They demanded that articles concerning immi-
gration and nationality in the 1341 Constitution be' abolished
.
It was the first time they would organize as a political in-
terest group to demand their inherent civil rights.
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The economic and socio-political condition., that ex-
isted in the West Indies after the abolition of slaveryj y
resulted in mass unemployment for the freed blacks. Inde-
pendently of this, Panama was striving for its autonomy and
the exploitation, of its geographic position—her most im-
portant resource. As a growing industrial power, those un-
employed blacks and Panama's location constituted an impor-
tant asset for the United States' expansionist goals. Chap-
ter one has shown how all the elements involved—West Indian
blacks, Panama and the United States— co verged for the con-
struction of the Panama railroad and later the Canal.
Chapter two indicates, how the mutual coexistence of
these groups proved to be a difficult problem. Inequality
of power and the cultural dissimilarities between them, made
their acceptance and adaptation to each other almost impossi-
ble, especially for Panamanians and V/est Indians.
As the United States became the strongest economic sup-
port for the Isthmus* maintenance of its service economy—
a
detrimental factor .to the development of a sound economic
system based on production--Panama was unable to react un-
favorably to the North American presence. On the other hand,
Panamanians thought that V.'est Indians had nothing else to offer
except problems and cause them inconvenience. Chapter three
demonstrates that in turn, Panamanians were able to react
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against them due to their precarious situation. The legis-
lative measures that were enacted, are proof of the ever-
growing and constantly aggressive governmental policy
affecting Y/est Indians. These laws, decrees and statutes
serve as indicators for the national and official rejection
of the Vest Indian immigrants. We have seen in Chapter
four how a nation became an independent republic and the un-
derlying reasons for the nationalistic tendencies which used
the West Indians as a stepping-stone towards Panama »s socio-
culturrl unification.
A large labor force was needed to construct the "road"
thai would reaffirm United States' power in the American con-
tinent, as well as the rest of the world. Panama also need-
ed that labor force in account of the thrust given' to the
facilities that allowed it to profit at its highest level up
to then, from. its riches in services which had an important
international value. The lenfit produced by the V.'est Indians
was diminished by the inconvenience of their living in Pana-
ma. Their numbers indicate the seriousness with which they
renounced to their islands in the hope of leading better
lives. SPhey hardly considered that one day they would be
branded as undesirables in their adopter! country. The Pana-
manian will for full independence unfortunately resulted in
the alienation cf a group who had shown through its work to
have rande - sincere contribution to the welfare of the Isth-
mus, regarless of who benefited. It is understandable that
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Panama tried to be the exclusive administrator of its terri-
tory, but the adoption of this unfavorable attitude towards
We st Indians, revealed the acute nature of the conflict of
Panamanian identity at the time.
I
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